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The noted historian Breasted said that the history of Egypt could
never be written because no one man could acquire the knowledge of the
many tongues necessary to transverse all of the fields of available research
material.
The same problem has cursed the study of legal history. Legal
historians, in the sublime egotism of the lawyer, have ignored the many
factors which have operated to develop the system of customal behavior
that we Olympic-like call "The Common Law." The oceans of panegyrics
that have flowed over Magna Charta submerge the humanistic influences
of selfishness, greed and religious fanaticism that led to the birth of that
Great Charter of Human Liberties. Those who every Law Day eulogize
the noble barons who confronted King John gloss over the fact that one
of the weightiest charges levied against the king was that he had given
sanctuary to the accursed race that had crucified the founder of the
established church.
It is a sad commentary on the depth of modern legal reasoning that
we attempt not merely to solve present-day problems but also to plan for
future developments on the basis of principles that were either formulated
to satisfy long past social, political and economic needs or arose out of
situations the existence of which have now been forgotten.
Our system of common law even in its codification mold, developed
under political, economic and cultural conditions of an English society,
crystallized during centuries when the population expansion was held
down to perhaps as little as five per cent. So firmly did the hand of time
compress these legal molecules, that this stratification firmly resisted the
population phenomenon that developed in the eighteenth century,' even
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. This explosion and its influence has been only lately recognized by historians.
Louis XIV was hard put to place fifty thousand men in the field at any time. A hundred
years later revolutionary France had a million men under arms. After another hundred
years France could only rally seven hundred and fifty thousand men at the Marne.
Ireland with less than half a million population after Cromwell may have had nine
million when the potato blight struck. Similar population growths seem to have occurred
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though this led to earthshaking changes in political and economic areas.
This was particularly true of the noble oak of the property law. Lord
Mansfield's petty sniping at Shelley's Case had no lasting effect except to
invoke the stern rebuke of Fearne.'
Even the tender mercies of that development of the legal philosophy
termed "equity," although it eventually penetrated to the recesses of the
property law in England,4 still left the American property law largely
unaffected.
The great expounders of the "Common Law," Coke, Pollock,
Maitland, Holdsworth, Holmes, even Plucknett, have all blithely ignored
the blight that stare decisis has cast on the development of modern society.
Untold economic wealth has been lost through the application of the
ferae naturae doctrine to hydrocarbons in place. Only recently has there
been a voice crying in the wilderness on the terror of the perpetuities
rules. The sloth of our law has permitted rules formulated too often by
dynastic struggles in English history to filter our social growth. Typical
of this legal inadequacy is the long lot of human misery created by the
application of the concept of caveat emptor to the relationship of landlord
and tenant.
DEVELOPMENT OF CAVEAT LESSEE
An established legal rule should not, of course, be today swept
away merely because it has long existed. But its continued functioning in
modern society should involve consideration as to why it was born and
whether the factors of its conception are still of importance in present-
day society.
Historical Foundations
The legal pundits' have stated that the "Common Law" was firm in
its position that there was no implied covenant on the part of the lessor
as to fitness of the leased premises either at the beginning or during the
continuation of the lease. The origin, as well as the causes, of this
doctrine of caveat emptor in leases is lost in the blue haze of history.6
It is regrettable that the light of English legal historical research has
not penetrated into the origin of that remarkable hermaphrodite, the
leasehold. The classic English historians pronounced the belief, which we
all over the world during the eighteenth century, hardly attributable to the "Industrial
Revolution."
2. Perrin v. Blake, 98 Eng. Rep. 355 (W.B. 1770).
3. FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (1770).
4. 15 George 5, c.20 (1926).
5. Shira's Doyle v. Union Pacific R.R., 147 U.S. 413 (1892); Bowe v. Hunking,
135 Mass. 380 (1882).
6. COKE, A COMMENTARY ON LITLETON *§ 102(a) [hereinafter cited as Co. LrrT.].
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accept cum grano salis, that the Conquest, the Northumbrain Rebellion
and the abortive Danish invasion that led to the Salisbury Oath resulted
in a concentration of title to all land in England, except the Channel Isles,
in the sovereign. The original feoffments were, therefore, separations of
the titular and the possessory rights in land only for life or during good
behavior. There was no passing of present consideration to the rever-
sioner, only the prospects of future revenue. By a latter development,
through the use of the words "et hereditibus suis," such possessory
estates became hereditary fees, with the family, not the individual, as the
unit of ownership. Later the development of covenants of warranty
permitted alienation by the terre-tenant to defeat the family.!
Although possession and title were thus united in the fee, they could
be separated in interest for the duration of life or for years. Eventually, a
major division developed between terms for life as freeholds and terms
for years as non-freehold estates.' This development is strange since there
is evidence that terms for years at that time were held by powerful
political organizations such as the church militant.' But for some
unexplained reason the term for years sank down to coalesce with the
villenage as a non-freehold interest in land.' °
Just when, where and why the distinction between the freehold life
estate and the non-freehold term arose is not clear." Originally, a term
of lease may have been a tenement subject to seizin"2 but not a "free
tenement."'" As late as Littleton 4 "leases" could be for life, or for life
7. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *ch. 1 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE]; CO.
LITT. § l(a). PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, ch. 3 (5th ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as PLUCKENTT].
8. BLACKSTONE 142 considered leaseholds as merely seasonal agricultural lettings.
This result, however, is immediately contradicted by indicating that long term leases
were mentioned in the Mortmain statute. Id. at 143.
9. It is possible that the reduced status of the term to a non-freehold estate was a
preconcived plan to enable religious corporations to avoid "mortmain" and various
other statutes by creating in the church corporations an interest in land that did not
require livery of seizin. The "use" may have had a similar origin.
Scutton, LAND IN FETTERS 65 (1886), suggests that De Viris Religosis was
necessitated by the use of the long term by religious corporations to avoid the inhibitions
of feoffments under Section 43 of the Magna Carta (1217) and Section 14 of the
Provisions of Westminister in 1259. See LITTLETON, TENURES § 7 [hereinafter cited as
LITTLETON] and Co. LITT. § 49(b) (but not a tenancy at will).
10. LITTLETON § 59.
11. The explanation suggested by Bacon, that the distinction arose by reason of the
fact that originally leases were only for a crop season, cannot be accepted in view of
evidence of early long term leases and that leases were at one period created by livery
of seizin.
12. But see Challis, Are Leaseholds Tenements, 6 LAW Q. REV. 69 (1890).
13. A lease for a term was valid even though the lessor died before the lessee
entered. This was not true in a feoffment. If the feoffor died before entry, the deed
was void. LITTLETON § 66. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115
(3rd ed. 1927 [hereinafter cited as POLLACK & MAITLAND].
14. LITTLETON § 217.
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of another or for terms of years.
Plucknett" suggests that the lowered status of the term for years
was due to its use as a security device to avoid the church's stigma on
usury. Maitland"0 attributed it to the influence of the Roman law of
usufruct in reducing a lease to a non-freehold interest.
The term for years did not wholly forget its noble beginnings,
however, and thus evolved that strange legal being, the leasehold as a
chattel real. Starting with the approach that certain of the legal con-
sequences of a leasehold follow real property and certain personal property
rules, the legal scholar finds delight in determining which of these
situations are followed in the various jurisdictions. With certain notable
exceptions such as the probate consequences17 and the doctrine of
caveat emptor, the cases are not in harmony as to whether on a particular
issue leaseholds are realty or personalty.
The courts are virtually unanimous that in all phases of the law of
decedent's estates a lease is personalty. But by a similar concord, the real
property concept of caveat emptor is attached to leases. This application
of the real property doctrine of "caveat emptor" to leaseholds has
resulted in a major legal storm.
It is accepted English doctrine that the lessor impliedly warrants
quiet enjoyment in the lessee as against any acts of the lessor and those
claiming under him or under a superior title." The lessor covenants
that he has the legal right to transfer possession to the lessee for the full
term. Thus arose the feudal trait whereby the lord incurred a duty to
protect the vassal. 9 As to whether there is also an implied covenant to
place the tenant in possession as against trespassers the cases disagree.20
But it is generally accepted that there is no implied covenant given
by the lessor that the leased premises are fit for any purpose. The leasehold
adheres to the common law concept of the fee in this regard. Apparently,
this doctrine of caveat emptor was retained because a leasehold is a
conveyance of an interest in land. In feoffments the rule was well
15. PLUCKNETT 572.
16. POLLOCK & MAITLAND 115.
17. That a leasehold is personalty for probate purposes seems to have been early
accepted. See Co. LITT. 46 and BLACKSTONE 144.
Chattels real pass to the executors of the grantee or lessee, not to the heirs or to
administrators. LITTLETON § 740; Co. LITT. § 387 (b).
18. Budd-Scott v. Daniell, [1902] 2 K.B. 351. But under English law this arose
not from the landlord-tenant relationship but by the use of the word "demise." Baynes v.
Lloyd, [18951 2 Q.B. 610.
19. See BLACKSTONE ch. 5.
20. No duty to place in possession. Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 N.E. 69
(1924) ; HARIs V. Greenberger, 50 App. Div. 439, 64 N.Y.S. 136 (Sup. Ct. 1900);
Contra, Adrian v. Robinawitz, 116 N.J. 586 A. 29 (1936); Block v. Busch, 160
Tenn. 21, 22 S.W.2d 242 (1929).
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established early."
The feudal obligation of the lord to defend his tenant's seizin was
itself an implied warranty. This may have died with Quia Emptores
Terrarum." Butler" felt that tenants thereafter insisted on a special
covenant of warranty as a quid pro quo for their attornment on alienation.
If it is true that the feoffment did not at first contemplate a present
passing of consideration to the feoffer but merely contemplated the
rendition of future services by the feoffee, the lack of any implied
covenant either of title or of fitness of use is understandable. Such
feoffments were primarily of rural areas and did not embrace substantial
improvements.
Even after the scheme of giving covenants of warranties by the
feoffor developed, presumably to permit the defeat of the heir,"4 there
was no implication of warranty of fitness in a feoffment. The land was
visible and the lessee had ample opportunity to discover defects.
It is reasonable that the common law of leases suffered this same
development. Leases, at least long term, were largely agricultural. The
parties were on an equal bargaining level and conditions were visible.
Actual tillers of the soil were either on a sharecropper basis of little
political force or were agricultural laborers whose deplorable economic
conditions were notorious but accepted. The dissatisfied lessee could
always default. Thus the law saw no necessity of placing a protective
cloak around the lessee either for economic or social reasons.
Nor did urban development in England see any impelling reason for
a change in the lease concept. In medieval England with its growth of
towns the political power was in the hands of the mercantile class. These
established citizens almost universally had their living quarters above their
places of business. They, at least the wealthier element, owned the fee of
their business-dwelling house. Their servants and employees were most
likely to be their tenants as well. This early forerunner of the notorious
company house, the "company store" of American mining history, was
not conducive to a consideration of the welfare of the tenant by his
employer-landlord. And in the rural areas the plight of the tenant farmer,
21. BLACKSTONE, 299. See also Co. LITT. 174.
22. 18 Edward 1 (1290).
23. Co. LIr. 365 (a) n. 1 (19th ed.)
24. Quia Emptores Terraum, 18 Edward 1 (1290). See 4 BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *301; POLLACK & MAITLAND 311; Co. LITT. 373.
Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edward 1 (1278) contemplated warranties. However, the
existence of such a warranty has been staunchly denied. See WRIGHT, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF TENURES, 38-40 (1750) and SCRUTrON, LAND IN FETTERS (1886).
Even the lessor's implied covenant of title gave way in the seventeenth century to
the express covenant of quiet enjoyment. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
250 (3rd ed. 1927).
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while the subject of sympathy among the English liberal writers, was not
of sufficient social significance to cause pressure to be brought on either
the courts or Parliament to change a doctrine by this time firmly
established in the common law.
Nothing else could be expected of an age in which freeholders alone
could exercise the ballot. The chains which bound the law of leases were
forged in the context of a lack of tenant political power. Tenant relief
was dependent upon the coming of universal suffrage and the passing
of the "freeholder" power factor.
The obligation to pay rent seems originally to have come out of the
produce of the real estate, not being due until the end of the term; the
obligation lay in property law.2" The giving of a covenant to pay rent
permitted the developing contract law to force its head into the picture.2
After the lessee had become personally obligated to pay a fixed sum
for the possession he had purchased, contract law with its equitable
overtones might have ameliorated the caveat emptor rule as applicable to
leases. The fact that the equitable thrust was but slight is tribute to the
rigidity of the property law.
English Cases
The recorded cases do not, however, support a bland assumption of
the firmness of the common law caveat lessee. When the issue was first
presented, counsel for the lessors were hard put to find authority for
their position. There was a tendency to repudiate the concept." It may
be that the stirrings of early Victorian conscience rebelled at applying the
doctrine to human habitation.
In the case of Collins v. Barrow,29 a tenant was discharged from
liability on a covenant to pay rent. The court relied on the fact that the
house was unfit for habitation because of dampness. The tenant's express
covenant to repair was held not to require him to undertake the expense
of constructing a sewer. In Edwards v. Etherington, ° a tenant was
allowed to quit where the premises had become unfit for habitation. And
in Salisbury v. Marshall,"' the court refused to require a tenant to
continue to pay rent where the house was not in a habitable state of
repair. None of these opinions mentioned the caveat emptor doctrine.
25. POLLOCK & MAITLAND 129. See LITTLETON § 58.
26. 8 Anne, c.14, § 4 (1709), first gave an action of covenant for rent.
27. See Erskene v. Adene, L.R. 6 Ch. 756 (1871) and Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1108 (K.B. 1843). See also BRACTON, DE LEGIBuS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE
(Woodbine ed. 1915-1942) and BACON, ABRIDGEMENT *633.
28. Presumably the Irish and the English argicultural laborers did not belong to
the human race.
29. 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ex. 1831).
30. 117 Eng. Rep. 1016 (Q.B. 1840).
31. 172 Eng. Rep. 268 (Com. Pl. 1829).
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Whether the rulings were based on a repudiation of the rule or whether
an exception of habitability was intended is uncertain.
The issue was first isquarely presented in the case of Smith. v.
Marrable.82 Lady Marrable sought to avoid a rental obligation of a
furnished house because of bug infestation. Baron Parke sustained her
position. It is not clear whether the decision was based on a noblesse
oblige, courtesy to a lady, a denial of caveat lessee, a furnished habitation
exception, or the theory of nuisance. In the opinion Baron Parke relied
upon the hoary precedents of Collins v. Barrow and Edwards v. Ethering-
ton.
These four cases furnished much grist for the mills of English
justice. The Law Barons were soon appalled at the vile heresy they
displayed. Even Baron Parke made his pilgrimage to Canossa. This re-
emergence of the sacred rights of property which marked the Chartest
failure and was so graphically portrayed in the Irish potato famine found
reflection in the case of Erskene v. Adeane,38 where the court refused to
apply Smith v. Marrable to leases of agricultural land.
In Hart v. Vindsor, 4 where the lessee tried in vain to avoid his
obligation because of vermin infestation, the judges purged themselves of
much of the pernicious heresy of Smith v. Marrable. There was a strong
feeling that the Marrable decision was erroneous.
In Sutton v. Temple35 the court adhered to caveat lessee in the case
of a lease of agricultural land. One judge, anticipating a possible present-
day American exception, assigned the Marrable decision to situations
in which property is leased for a specific purpose. Parke, however,
heaped ashes upon his own head by admitting that Edwards v. Ethering-
ton and Collins v. Barrow, on which he had rested his opinion, were
erroneously decided. He excused Smith v. Marrable on the theory that
the letting of personalty being involved, the law merchant as to chattels
prevailed. 6
Keats v. Earl Cadagon"7 likened the rental of a house to the
purchase of goods-a taking for better or for worse. Chadwick v. No-
land 8 limited Smith v. Marrable to seasonable lettings of furnished
premises or to furnished rooms in a hotel, ignoring the modern distinc-
tion between a lodger and a tenant. Presumably bedbugs in a chair were
taboo but bedbugs in the room were acceptable.
32. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
33. L.R. 6 Ch. 756 (1871).
34. 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).
35. 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843).
36. Id.
37. 138 Eng. Rep. 234 (Ex. 1851).
38. 136 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ex. 1848).
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Some of the judges in attempting to avoid Smith v. Marrable
relied upon the fact of the leasing of personalty in that case and an
assertion that caveat emptor did not apply to personalty. This assertion
was not universally approved. But none explained why in this instance
leases were to be treated as realty.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the English courts 9
adopted a more human element. Baron Parke's retraction was in turn
repudiated and Smith v. Marrable reinstated as a furnished dwelling
exception to the "common law" rule."° The courts, however, refused to
make this a total exception. Its application was limited to bug infestation,
clogged drains, disease or other unlawful situations"' which would
today be considered nuisances.42 The lessor was not required to make
repairs, and lessors' covenants to repair were independent." By statute,
however, an exception was recognized in the case of houses let for low
rent. 4 A further exception was admitted as to that portion of the
premises of which the lessor retained possession."'
Counsel for lessees, while accepting the caveat lessee rule as part of
their fate, did not dispair, but attacked on the perimeter. From these
legal battles three concepts evolved:
(a) The basic philosophy that there is no implied covenant of fitness
of use at the outset, and the satellite theories that;
(b) there is no implied covenant of continued fitness of use during
the duration of the lease; and
(c) the lessor is not liable to the lessee nor to others for torts result-
ing from the condition of the premises.
The sanctity of these doctrines has been almost universally admitted.
Their opposition has centered the attack upon "exceptions" to the
stated rules.
39. Under Scottish law the landlord was under an obligation to let a house in
habitable condition, but not to so maintain it. Cameron v. Young I.T.C. 176 (Scot. 1908).
40. Wilson v. Finch-Halton, L.R. 2 Eq. 336 (1865). A leading English authority
felt that Wilson v. Finch-Halton had reaffirmed the doctrine of Smith v. Marrable as to
furnished houses. See WOODFALL, LANDLORD & TENANT 213 (23rd ed. Blundell ed. 1960).
41. Parnell v. Chester, 52 L.T.R. (n.s.) 722 (K.B. 1885).
42. Even in the furnished house situation with an express covenant of fitness of
habitation, the bug infestation must constitute a nuisance of serious and substantial
extent. Parnell v. Chester, 52 L.T.R. (n.s.) 722 (K.B. 1885).
Knowledge of lessor that the previous tenant was suffering from tuberculosis
made furnished house unfit for habitation and justified terminating lease. Collins v.
Hopkins, [1923] 2 K.B. 617.
43. Even where the lessor was bound by custom or by contract to repair, his
failure so to do was not a defense to an action on rent. See Hart v. Rayus, [1916]
K.B. 646; Green v. Symns, 13 L.T.R. (n.s.) 301 (K.B. 1897); Longmore v. Blant, 12
L.T.R. (n.s.) 520 (K.B. 1896); and Kennard v. Achman, 10 L.T.R. (n.s.) 213 (K.B.
1894).
44. Housing Act of 1925, 15 George 5, c.14.
45. Demster v. Holles, [1918] 2 K.B. 795.
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The lessees early attacked the "duration" corollary of the caveat
lessee doctrine. Was the lessee absolved from further liability when
benefit of use was affected by (a) military action, (b) loss by water, and
(c) destruction by fire? In each instance there are the further problems
of whether the existence of a covenant to pay rent introduces the contract
law so as to bind the lessee regardless of possibility of yield from the
demised premises, whether equity should relieve from the harshness of
the contract, and who equitably should bear the consequences of a loss
for which neither was responsible."'
The early cases indicate that military action did not exonerate the
lessee." But doubt was expressed as to the correctness of this position."8
Likewise, there was doubt as to the effect of destruction by fire or
water."9 But the English law finally resolved this issue also in favor of
the lessor.5" The commercial frustration doctrine has not become rooted
in the English law.5 '
46. Bacon distinguished between covenants implied by law, the performance of
which the law excuses when the party without fault is unable to perform, and those cre-
ated by contract, where the conventor creates a duty or charge upon himself which he is
bound to make good, not withstanding an accident by unavoidable remedy. 5 BACON,
ABRIDGEMENT* ch. 7. Bacon stated further that where no equitable circumstances arise,
equity will not relieve from an express covenant on account of the destruction of the
value of the subject by subsequent accident. Accordingly, where a tenant covenants to
repair damage by fire he continues to remain liable for the payment of the rent though
the premises be destroyed by fire, the equity of the parties being equal the covenant of the
law prevails. Id.
47. In Harrison v. North, [1891] 1 Ch. 83, a house was seized by Parliament for
use as a hospital. The Lord Chancellor stated his desire to relieve the tenant if he could.
The final outcome of the case is not recorded.
48. During the Scottish troubles the tenant was relieved. Y.B. 9 Ed. 3 (1336).
49. Bacon distinguished between the case where land was covered by the sea and
where burnt with wildfire. The former discharging the rent obligation, the latter
resulting in apportionment. 6 BACON, ABRIDGEMENT *49-50.
A distinction has been asserted between loss of use (which falls on the lessee)
and total destruction of the leased premises (which terminates the lease). Several cases
support the assertion that equity will relieve the rent obligation upon destruction of the
premises. See 73 Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889), 172 Eng. Rep. 609 (Com. Pl. 1829),
Harrison v. North, L.R. 1 Ch. (1865) and Steel v. Wright, 1 T.R. 708 (Ch. 1821).
Scottish Law, the Code Napolean, the Civil Code of Louisiana and the Ancient
Egyptian laws of Senestres all relieved the tenant in case of total destruction. PUFEN-
DORFF, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS Ch. 5 (1931).
50. In Belfour v. Weston, 99 Eng. Rep. 1112 (K.B. 1786) the tenant covenanted
to repair the premises. The house was destroyed by fire. The court, relying on a prior
statement of Lord Mansfield, held that the tenant was still liable for rent. See also Monk
v. Cooper, 93 Eng. Rep. 832 (K.B. 1725) (liable for rent even though the house is
blown down); Izon v. Gortin, 132 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Com. Pl. 1839) (tenants of a
second floor destroyed by fire are still liable for rent) and Carter v. Cummins, 1 L.R. 1
Ch. 84 (1865) (wharf swept away).
In Richard Le Faverners Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 811 (K.B. 1886), the court said, "if
the sea again come upon part of the land demised or part be burned with wildfire, the
entire rent shall issue out of the remainder." See Maisfall v. Shofeld, 47 L.T.R. 405
(KB. 1855) and Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1792).
51. Grimsdeck v. Sweetinan, [1909] 1 K.B. 704.
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England has now returned to Smith v. Marrable by the Housing
Act of 1925,52 which provides that any dwelling in the administrative
county of London renting for less than forty pounds, or elsewhere for
less than twenty-six is a working-class dwelling which the landlord
must keep in all respects reasonably fit for human habitation.
The cold logic of the law extended to tort liability. The lessor had
surrendered possession to the lessee; his entrance on the premises, even
to make repairs, was a trespass. Therefore, the lessor was not liable to
the lessee, his family, nor those on the premises with the lessee's consent,
for torts incurred as a result of a defective condition of the premises. 3
The lessor who let an unfurnished house in a dangerous condition was
not liable to the tenant for personal injuries.5"
CAVEAT LESSEE IN AMERICA
Scope of the Rule
The American authorities have accepted both the principal rule and
its two corollaries as the "Common Law." The American cases are in
accord in following the precept that the lessor covenants (a) that he has
title and (b) that he has present right of possession. In approximately
half of the American jurisdictions the lessor also covenants that he will
place the lessee in possession.55 In no jurisdiction, however, does the
lessor impliedly covenant that the leased premises are fit for the use
intended by the lessee.
While no instance has been found in which the tide of dissent has
been sufficiently strong to impell the courts to sweep away this dike of
legal irresponsibility, certain definite cracks have occurred. Changes in the
basic "common law" rule of caveat lessee or any of its derivatives may be
effected by the terms of the lease, allowing a further intrusion of contract
concepts with equitable overtones into the property law.
The earliest American judges in the area had the same difficulty as
their English contemporaries in recognizing the existence of the "common
law" rule."6 But later courts, even in those states which had accepted the
52. 15 George 5, c. 14, §1.
53. Tredway v. Marbin, 91 L.T.R. 415 (Ch. 1899).
54. Bottomby v. Banister, [1932] 1 K.B. 488 (noticing the possibility of a
condition being dangerous per se). See Brandt v. Yeager, 199 A.2d 768 (Del. Super. Ct.
1964); Cobb v. Lord, 202 A.2d 560 (Me. Sup. Ct. 1964); Lopez v. Gukenback, 391
Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958) and Corcione v. Ruggieri, 139 A.2d 388 (R.I. Sup. Ct.
1958).
55. E.g., Cleveland & St. L. R.R. v. Joyce, 54 Ind. App. 658, 103 N.E. 354 (1913);
Vincent v. Defield, 98 Mich. 84 (1893). Contra, Budler v. Fish, 14 Ind. App. 27 (1895)
O'Brien v. Smith, 13 N.Y.S. 408 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
56. Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 117 (1856) ; Godley v. Hargerty, 20 Pa. 387 (1853).
It is interesting that the courts attributed liability to the lessor even though the bailee,
the United States government, was immune from suit.
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Common Law as of 1607," have followed the decisions of the English
judges after 1850 to the effect that the rule had always existed."
This is equated to the tame American acquiesence to the English shaping
of the Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting which was never even spoken
of prior to 1618."9
American Exceptions to the Rule
The caveat lessee rule has rarely been attacked directly. However, the
American lawyers have been more ingenious than their English brethren
in inducing the conscience of the courts to recognize "exceptions," not
merely to the rule itself, but also to its two corollaries."0 Exceptions6'
have been proposed in the case of nuisance, furnished habitations, short
term seasonal leases, constructive eviction, commercial frustration, lessors'
covenants, lettings for public use, knowledge of lessor of improper
conditions or concealment amounting to fraud, areas in common use,
lease of part of a building, multiple dwelling, fiduciary relationships,
houses built by the lessor for rent, or special statutes. 2
Landlord has no duty to repair. Gallagher v. Button, 46 A. 819 (Conn. Sup. Ct.
1900) ; Divines v. Dickinson, 189 Iowa 194, 174 N.W. 9 (1919).
57. 4 James 1 (1609).
58. Hart v. Windsor was adopted by Foster v. Peyser, 63 Mass. (9 Cush) 242
(1852).
Holding Smith v. Marrable overruled on a mere exception. Naumberg v. Young,
44 N.J.L. 331 (1882).
Asserting that Smith v. Marrable is shaken but is not overruled so far as it
applies to reality: Dutton v. Gerrish, 63 Mass. (9 Cush) 89 (1851) ; Mayer v. Moller
1 Hilt 491 (N.Y. 1867) ; Bennett v. Sullivan, 100 Me. 118, 60 A. 886 (1905) ; Thellusson
v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112 (1867) ; Cadell v. Palmer (1833) 1 Cl. & F 373; Childe v.
Baylie, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
59. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas 1, 26 (1682), could not go back for
precedent further than Childe v. Baylie, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
60. Illinois, while adopting the common law rule, has made so many exceptions that
like the puppy's tail, it is doubtful whether what is left is longer than what was
excised. Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Il. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954).
61. Theunissen v. Huyler's, Inc., 25 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1928) ; Treharne v.
Flint, 324 Ill. App. 546, 58 N.E.2d 638 (1944) ; Allen v. Forsyth, 25 N.Y.S.2d 822
(Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Weddle v. Parrish, 135 Ore. 345, 295 P. 454 (1931).
There is a major exception in the case of the so-called "mineral lease." Moore v.
Lackey Min. Co., 215 Ky. 71, 284 S.W. 415 (1926).
The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 355-361 (1934) recognizes only the exceptions of
negligent performance of covenants to repair, concealment of conditions, public use and
retention of control exceptions.
Uninhabitability held grounds for termination by lease. Leonard v. Armstrong, 73
Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889); Campbell v. Frances, 378 S.W.2d 790 (Tenn. 1964)
(implying covenant of habitability) ; Shawmakers v. Bayer, 3 Pa. County Ct. 271 (1873).
Duty of lessor to inspect premises and make repairs on lessee's demand. Canfield
v. Howard, 109 Ga. App. 566, 136 S.E.2d 431 (1964).
Duty of lessor to turn the premises over to tenant in safe condition for living and
working. Campbell v. Frances, 378 S.W.2d 790 (Tenn. 1964).
Minnesota implied a condition of habitability in the case of multiple apartment
dwellings. Detawater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
62. A Louisianna statute requires the lessor to deliver the premises in good con-
dition. Barrow v. Culver Bros. Garage, 78 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 1955).
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I. Marrable Case
Baron Parke's philosophy of "nuisance" advanced in Smith v.
Marrable has been relied upon by some of the American courts to avoid
the impact of caveat emptor.6" Thus, as in England,64 the presence of
infection or disease has made the lessor vulnerable not merely to a
surrender by the lessee,"5 but also to tort liability.66 The existence of
illegal conditions or unsanitary factors67 which would constitute a public
nuisance are also grounds for relief to the lessee. No distinction has been
made between public and private nuisance.
One who, by letting the premises, puts it out of his power to abate an
existing nuisance is as much responsible for a tort resulting therefrom
as one who fails to abate the nuisance while it is in his power so to do.
However, the cases disagree as to whether the lessor must have had
actual knowledge of the existence of the nuisance at the time he makes the
demise or whether he may be charged with constructive knowledge.68
The doctrine of Smith v. Marrable has been assumed to apply to an
implied covenant of habitability of furnished dwellings.69 In this context
the doctrine has been extended to include unfurnished residences.7" The
exception to the caveat emptor rule in the case of 'short term leases, such
63. Nuisance caused by noise of overhead tenant's family justified plea of con-
structive eviction. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Bresterman, 168 Misc. 126, 5 N.Y.S.2d 272
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
Rental of house is similar to purchase of goods, requiring inspection and a taking
for better or for worse. Keats v. Earl Cadagon, 138 Eng. Rep. 234 (Ex. 1851).
Smith v. Marrable limited to seasonable lettings of furnished premises comparable
to furnished rooms in a hotel. Chadwick v. Woodward, 136 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ex. 1848).
64. Bud v. Lord Grenville, 1 Cab & Ellis 316 (R.I. 1882); Wolfe v. Arrott, 109
Pa. 473, 1 A. 333 (1885).
65. The presence of mice justifies abandonment even though the lease provided
that presence of vermin would not affect the obligations under the lease. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Winslow, 183 Misc. 754, 52 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
Vermin provided no excuse for terminating lease where landlord would be required
to trespass on the leased premises to get rid of the vermin. Gunther v. Oliver, 117
A 402 (N.J. 1922).
66. Nuisance justifies termination where it is caused by lessor, is tortious, and
renders premises unfit for purpose of the lessee. Bahcall v. Gloss, 244 Wis. 473,
12 N.W.2d 674 (1944). A distinction has been made between public and private nuisance.
Rosewell v. Prior, 91 Eng. Rep. 397 (1795) ; Swords v. Edgar, 59 N.Y. 28 (1874).
67. Hartenbauery v. Brumbaugh, 220 Ill. App. 326 (1920).
68. J. W. Cushman & Co. v. Thompson, 58 Misc. Rep. 539, 109 N.Y.S. 757
(Sup. Ct. 1908) (notice stressed).
No duty of landowner to warn tenant of dangerous natural conditions. Hersch v.
Anderson Acres, 146 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio 1957) ; Lathers v. Coates, 18 Misc. Rep. 231,
41 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
Collins v. Hopkins, [1923] 2 K.B. 617 (furnished house, tuberculosis).
69. But see Dutton v. Gerrish, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 89 (1851). The court refused to
imply a covenant of fitness in a lease where there was no express use described in the
lease. It mentioned Smith v. Marrable and stated that Smith had probably been overruled.
See also Royce v. Guggerfurm, 106 Mass. 201 (1870).
70. Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577, 51 N.W. 695 (1899).
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as seasonal rentals of furnished dwellings,7' has found some acceptance.
There has also been reliance on the theory of constructive eviction
resulting from unfitness of habitation. 2
A few cases have placed property leased for business purposes in the
same category as furnished houses."3 The weight of United States
authority, however, is to the contrary,7 4 even where machinery is included
in the lease.75
II. Provisions in the Lease
In all of these situations a statement of purpose in the lease may or
may not be of importance, depending apparently on the attitude of the
particular court."
71. Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Hacher v. Nitschke, 310
Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942).
Implied covenant in summer furnished house. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629,
70 N.E.2d 793 (1947) ; Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892) ; Ackarey
v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946) (extending Ingalls v. Hobbs to
structural conditions of the house).
Presence of beetles in large furnished house at seashore did not absolve the lessee.
Davenport v. Smith, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947).
72. Lloyd Const. Co. v. Dudgeon, 76 Misc. Rep. 246, 134 N.Y.S. 888 (Sup. Ct.
1912) ; Tallman v. Earle, 3 Misc. Rep. 76, 23 N.Y.S. 17 (N.Y.C.P. 1893); Berlinger v.
MacDonald, 146 App. Div. 5, 133 N.Y.S. 522 (1912) (actions for rent) ; McCurdy v.
Wyckoff, 73 N.J.L. 368, 63 A. 992 (1906); Streep v. Simpson, 80 Misc. Rep. 666,
141 N.Y.S. 863 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Tallman v. Murphy, 135 App. Div. 376, 345, 24 N.E.
716 (1909) (action for rent).
Failure to provide heat is a constructive eviction. Ira Handleman Bldg. Corp. v.
Dolan, 15 Ill. App. 2d 49, 145 N.E.2d 250 (1957).
Bedbugs constitute a constructive eviction. Hancock Construction Co. v. Bassinger,
198 N.Y.S. 614 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
Failure of landlord to furnish steam heat as covenanted is a constructive eviction
in an agreement. Lawrence v. Burrell 17 Abb. N. Cas. 312 (1885).
In McMillan v. Wickstrom, 244 Mass. 159, 138 N.E. 253 (1923), a suite of rooms
was rented with no electricity, no gas and doors without knobs or locks. The lessee
secured a promise from the landlord to repair. The lessee remained in possession for
several months, paid part of the rent, but refused to pay the rest based upon a failure
of landlord to perform. The court held that failure to repair did not constitute a con-
structive eviction, nor relieve the lessee of the burden of paying rent. The right of
tenant to damages would be worked out through independent or cross action and not by
way of recoupment to obligations of defendant to pay rent for use and occupation of the
premises while he occupied them.
73. Kanes v. Koutras, 203 Ga. 570, 47 S.E.2d 558 (1948).
No implied covenant of fitness on agricultural land. Roger v. Rob Ray Plantation
Co., 208 Ark. 429, 186 S.W.2d 661 (1945). Davey v. Christoff, 28 D.L.R. 447 (Ont. Sup.
Ct. 1916).
74. Kulchera v. Graft, 191 Iowa 1200, 184 N.W. 297 (1921); Taylor v. Finnigan,
189 Mass. 568, 76 N.E. 203 (1905) ; York v. Stewart, 21 Mont. 515, 55 P. 29 (1898) ;
Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111 (1908); Charlow v. Blankenship, 80 W.Va. 200, 92
S.E. 318 (1917) (denying that the renting of a refrigeration room for commercial
purposes was within the Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892) exception
of implied habitaiblity).
75. Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331 (1882); Fitts v. Hanks, 209 Ore. 1, 303
P.2d 220 (1956).
76. Lessee may terminate the lease if the lessor fails to maintain the property in a
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Even when the lessor has himself altered the common law rule by
expressly covenanting to repair or by voluntarily assuming the duty to
make repairs, the courts have been reluctant to shake off the caveat
emptor concept. When the issue is the release of the lessee's obligation to
pay rent, the courts have usually treated the lessor's promise to repair as
an independent covenant." In the case of torts, a mere breach of the duty
to repair does not create a liability against the lessor. Such liability
arises only from a negligent attempt to perform his contractual obliga-
tion."8
It has been held that a limitation of purpose of use in a lease implies
a covenant of fitness for the intended use."
III. Public Use
When the use contemplated by the lessee involves the presence of the
general public, there is some support for a theory of an implied covenant
of fitness by the lessor. This exception is more prominent, however, in
the tort liability situation.
IV. Lessor Knowledge
There is a creditable body of authority supporting a further exception
where the lessor had or should have had knowledge of the lack of fitness
of use, and. the lessee does not have such knowledge.8 " But where the
condition fit for the purpose for which it is leased. Guillot v. Morgan, 165 So.2d 330
(La. App. 1964).
See Doyle v. Union Pacific R.R., 147 U.S. 413 (1893) ; Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal.
173, 18 P. 260 (1888) ; Chatard, Bishop v. O'Donovan, 80 Ind. 20 (1881) ; Jaffee v.
Harteau, 56 N.Y. 398 (1874).
No implied covenant from a statement of intended use. Conradi v. Arnold, 34 Wash.
2d 730, 209 P.2d 491 (1949) ; Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950).
No common law covenant of suitability of use even though the intended purpose was
known to the lessor. Daniels v. Brunton, 7 N.J. 102, 80 A.2d 547 (1951).
Unsuitability for express purposes releases the lessee. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2692
(Slovenko 1961) ; Siracusa v. Leloup, 28 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1946).
Covenant that premises shall be put to no other use implies a covenant of fitness
for the stated use. Wolfe v. Arrott, 109 Pa. 473, 1 A. 333 (1885).
77. Leadfdale v. Mesa Wholesale Sales Terminal, 79 Ariz. 112, 284 P.2d 649 (1955).
Covenant to repair is independent of the covenant to pay rent. Obermeyer v.
Nichols, 6 Benney 159, 6 Am Dec. 439 (1813) ; Edwards v. Ward Associates, Inc.,
367 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963).
Covenant to heat held mutually dependent with covenant to pay rent. Duncan
Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955)
Stevenson Stanoyevich Fund v. Steinacher, 125 N.J.L. 326, 15 A.2d 772 (1940).
No liability from agreement to repair. Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 137 A.2d
771 (1958).
78. Lessor's promise to repair must amount to a covenant to keep in good
condition. Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Ill. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952).
79. Isreal v. Beale, 270 Mass. 61, 199 N.E. 777 (1930) ; Waterbury v. Riss & Co.,
169 Kan. 271, 219 P.2d 673 (1950) ; Young v. Collett, 63 Mich. 331 (1886).
80. Franklin v. Tracy, 117 Ky. 267, 77 S.W. 1113 (Ct. App. 1904).
Terminating lease on grounds of fraudulent concealment of conditions making
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lessor's knowledge is a factor, the cases scatter to the four winds on the
consequences. The exception based on the landlord's knowledge divides
into the problem of actual versus constructive knowledge of the lessor,
actual or constructive knowledge of the lessee, and moves from actual
fraud through misrepresentation to a duty to disclose. Does the lessor
have a duty to come forward with his knowledge of existing conditions;
and, if so, is it limited to nuisance situations? The cases are not in
harmony."' The basis of the exception is a concept of fraud by the lessor.
But must the lessor have had actual knowledge of the existence of the
conditions and their effect on the lessee ?2 Or may knowledge or notice
be imputed to the lessor ? And to what extent must the lessor make
known the situation to the lessee when the facts are such that the lessee
could have acquainted himself therewith, or that knowledge could be
imputed to the lessee ?4
The tenant may, of course, terminate the rental contract on the
basis of fraudulent representations by the landlord which induced the
tenant to enter the contract.8" Here the equity concepts of contract law
premises uninhabitable. Goldberg v. Reed, 116 A. 429 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1922).
Contra, Murry v. Albertson, 50 N.J.E. 167, 13 A. 394 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888).
Latent or dangerous conditions known to the lessor and not discoverable by
ordinary means. Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902) ; Steefel v.
Rothschild, 179 N.Y. 273, 72 N.E. 112 (1904) ; Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37
P.2d 689 (1934).
Suppression of truth by lessor as a defense. Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477 (1873)
Ceasar v. Karutz, 60 N.Y. 229 (1875) (contagious disease) ; Rhenelander v. Seaman, 13
Abb. N. Cas. 455 (N.Y. 1881) (previous use as house of prostitution).
Under the English law the lessor is not liable to repair even though he knew of the
state of property at the time of letting. Nelson v. Liverpool Brewing Co., L.R. 2 C.P.D.
311 (1877).
81. See Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889) (dictum) ; White 1.
De Vito Realty Co., 120 Conn. 331, 180 A. 461 (1935) ; Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard,
65 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 698 (1934).
82. Constructive notice. Hill v. Norton, 74 W.Va. 428, 82 S.E. 363 (1914).
Actual notice required. Larson v. Calders Pack. Co., 54 Utah 325, 180 P. 599
(1919) ; Ahern v. Steele, 115 N.Y. 203, 22 N.E. 193 (1889).
Roberts v. Rogers, 129 Neb. 298, 261 N.W. 354 (1935) (before it can be said that
the landlord is advised of defects, he must see them himself, not be informed by some-
one else).
83. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 328, 34 S.W. 420 (1896).
84. No obligation where the lessor discovers a latent defect after the beginning of
the tenancy. Corcione v. Ruggieri, 87 R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958).
Knowledge of defect by tenant, actual or constructive, excuses lessor, Lopez v.
Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958). Contra, Batterman v. Levenson, 102
Misc. Rep. 92, 168 N.Y.S. 197 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
85. Exception of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of a hidden material
defect. Looney v. Smith, 96 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Meyers v. Rosen'back, 5
Misc. Rep. 337, 25 N.Y.S. 521 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1893) ; Wallace v. Lent, 29 How. Practice
289 (N.Y.C.P. 1865).
False representations by the lessor as to tenable conditions voided the lease.
Jackson v. Odell, 14 Abb. N. Cas. 47 (N.Y. 1882) (odors from sewer gas caused
typhoid fever).
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appear. But the property law counters by contrasting a bad faith mis-
representation regarding a hidden condition (concerning which the tenant
had made inquiry and the existence of which he could not have himself
discovered prior to taking possession), to mere "puffing. 8 6
V. Additional Considerations
When the lease covers only a portion of a unit, such as a floor of a
building,87 or in the case of a multiple unit dwelling,8" the courts both
in the principal rule and the two corollaries have been quick to find an
exception involving areas reserved by the lessor for the common use of
himself or of the several tenants. Here there is an implied covenant that
such common areas are suitable and safe."
It has been suggested that when the lessor stands in a fiduciary
relationship to the lessee, there exists an implied covenant of fitness of
purpose.
An attempt has been made to find an exception similar to the
craftsman concept under the law merchant where the lessor has con-
structed a house for rental purposes. A similar idea has been advanced in
houses built for sale."
Lessees have placed considerable reliance, with varying degrees of
success, on the doctrine of a particular unfit condition resulting in a
constructive eviction.9 And some states have made certain statutory
86. Representation that house was good, safe and fit to live in was a mere
expression of opinion and not a warranty of safe condition. Walsh v. Schmidt, 206
Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496 (1910) ; Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P.2d 346 (1938)
Ask v. Meeks, 118 N.Y.S. 821 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
87. Exception where lessor lets only part of the building since tenant does not
have control of the building. Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448, 183
P.2d 514 (1947).
Exception of fiduciary relationship between lessor and lessee. Anderson Drive-In
Theatres, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506 (1953) (dictum).
88. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
89. Post v. Vetter, 2 E.D. Smith (N.Y.) 248 (1853) ; Smith v. Earl Douglas
Hanson, 9 Misc. Rep. 2d 244, 170 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Exception in the case of construction or alteration for particular purpose. Woolford
v. Electric Appliances, 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938); J.D. Young Corp. v.
McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
Illinois, as to common passageways or other portions used in common, also
distinguishes between a lease for years where the lessor was not liable for repairs and
did not covenant fitness, and a short term lease, Viterbor v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707
(1887) ; Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809).
90. England did not recognize the house built for sale exception. Bottemly v.
Banister, [1932] 1 K.B. 458 (1930).
91. Maywood v. Logan, 78 Mich. 135, 43 N.W. 1052 (1889); Berlinger v. Mac-
Donald, 149 App. Div. 5, 133 N.Y.S. 522 (1912); Hancock Const. Co. v. Bassinger,
198 N.Y.S. 614 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Moddes v. Bullock, 115 N.Y.S. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1909);
McWhitton v. Wickstrom, 244 Mass. 159, 138 N.E. 253 (1923).
Failure of landlord to furnish steam as covenanted held a constructive eviction from
an apartment. Lawrence v. Burrell, 17 Abb. N. Cas. 312 (N.Y. 1885).
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exceptions to the rule, as they have more frequently done in the tort
situation.92
One further deviation from the norm has been discovered by the
courts in the difference between a landlord-tenant and an employer-
employee relationship. In the latter case, housing may be furnished as
part of compensation."3 Although there is dissent,"4 courts have taken
the position in this situation that the employee is a licensee, not a
possessor. 5 It follows that since possession remains in the lessor,
liability, at least in tort, should rest in him also.
California has made an exception when the property is not in exist-
ence at the time of the lease, but is created later.98
The law conceivably could have recognized the historical problem
as to whether the obligation to pay rent issues out of the land, or stems
from the covenant to pay. A distinction might also be made between mere
use and occupancy, and formal leases. While the English courts noticed
each of these facets, the distinctions have not been pressed in the American
decisions. Nor has the intervention of the interesse termini been of major
importance."7
In virtually all of the exceptions the condition has been treated as a
condition subsequent, voiding the lease at the option of the lessee, rather
than as a covenant compelling the lessor to place the premises in a
condition satisfactory to meet the desired use. There is little inclination
92. Statute requiring a multiple dwelling to be kept vermin free. Conners v.
Benjamin I. Magid, Inc., 353 Mich. 628, 91 N.W.2d 875 (1958).
Tenant may not avoid the obligations of the lease, even under a statute, if he has
had an opportunity to inspect before entry. Green v. Redding, 92 Cal. 548, 28 P. 599
(1891).
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (1946) requires the landlord to keep the premises
in repair. See People v. Robertson, 281 App. Div. 990, 120 N.Y.S.2d 883 (App. Div.
Sup. Ct. 1953). New Jersey has a similar requirement under the N.J. REV. STAT. §
55:7-1 (1964). See Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super 294, 76 A.2d 73 (1950).
The District of Columbia requires a landlord to maintain common areas, D.C.
CODE § 45-1610 (1961). See Goldberg v. Charles C. Koones & Co., 66 A.2d 495
(D.C. Munt App. 1949).
Georgia by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1935), has imposed a duty to repair
on a landlord, distinguishing between a landlord-tenant relationship and an estate for a
term of years when the duty to repair is on the the tenant, Evans Theatre Corp. v. De
Gire Investment Co., 79 Ga. App. 62, 52 S.E.2d 655 (1949).
93. Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 530, 30 So. 488, (1901) ; Reeder v. Bell, 70 Ky.
(7 Bush) 255 (1870) ; see cases collected in 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROVERTY § 1034
(1959).
94. Snedaker v. Powell, 32 Kan. 396, 4 P. 869 (1884); State v. Smith, 100 N.
C. 466, 6 S.E. 84 (1888).
95. Relationship of employer held landlord and tenant so no liability to employer
for tort. Tucker v. Pack Yarn Mill Co., 194 N.C. 726, 140 S.E. 744 (1927).
96. Friedman v. Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952).
97. In Edwards v. McLean, 122 N.Y. 302 (1890), the tenant could not avoid a
lease where during the interesse termini there was an infectious illness of the former
tenant.
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to give the lessee an action of specific performance on an implied covenant
to repair. The courts are also reluctant to award damages to the lessee
for the lessor's breach.9" The tort area is the only major situation
in which any penalty other than a loss of rents is imposed on the lessor.""
When the lease is vitiated under one of the exceptions, the result is
usually treated as an apportionment of rent rather than an avoidance of the
obligation ab initio.
The whole story is a fascinating study of the workings of the
judicial mind, Baron Parke beating his breast at the thought that he had
sinned against the common law, later judges, English and American,
adhering to the stare decisis line of Smith v. Marrable and ignoring
Baron Parke's me peccavi, and none daring to think independently and
to render a decision based on current human needs.
Thus we must accept as gospel in the United States the basic
principle of caveat lessee: there is not an implied covenant of fitness of
use in a lease, 00 not even of habitability in the case of dwellings.1"'
This is in sharp contrast to the warranty of fitness of use found in the
transfer of goods under the commercial law and reaffirmed in the Uniform
Commercial Code." 2
Covenant of Continued Benefit
The companion rule that the lease does not carry an implied
covenant or conditions of continued benefit to the lessee has also remained
largely unshaken in the United States.' However, three circumstances
98. Bliss v. Clark, 104 Misc. Rep. 543, 172 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Martin v.
Richards, 155 Mass. 381, 29 N.E. 591 (1892) (damages awarded).
99. Conner v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
100. No implied warranty of fitness. Jaf fee v. Harteau, 56 N.Y. 398 (1874);
Vallon v. Nat. Life Ass'n. Co., 20 N.Y. 32 (1859); Keates v. Cadogan, 138 Eng. Rep.
324 (C.P. 1851).
No implied covenant of condition. Croskey v. Shawnee Realty Co., 225 S.W.2d 509
(Mo. Ct. App. 1949) ; Siegert v. Taubman, 85 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1948).
Caveat Emptor. Rette v. Meierjohan, 78 Ohio App. 387, 70 N.E.2d 684 (1946)
Hill v. Woodman, 14 Me. 38 (1836).
Lessor has no implied covenant to repair. Hoover v. Wukasch, 274 S.W.2d 458
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
No implied covenant of fitness in the absence of fraud. Sill v. O'Rourke, 352
Mich. 318, 89 N.W.2d 463 (1958).
But the civil law treated a lease for use as a transfer of the use and enjoyment, and
hence the lessor was under an implied duty to keep in repair and fit for use. Durham v.
Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954).
101. Dwyer v. Wollard, 205 App. Div. 546, 199 N.Y.S. 840 (1923); Hill v. Wood-
man, 14 Me. 38 (1836) ; Graves v. Cameron, 58 How. Pr. 75 (1879).
No implied covenant to keep premises in a habitable condition. Post v. Vetter, 2
E.D. Smith (N.Y.) 248 (1853).
102. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
103. Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns (N.Y.) 44, 3 Am. Dec. 457 (Sup. Ct. 1808);
Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897) ; Ripley v.
Wightman, 7 S. C. 169, 4 McCord 447 (Ct. App. 1828).
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have been recognized which may justify the lessee in abandoning the
leased premises for reasons not due to fault of the lessor: (a) total
destruction of the property for causes not within the lessee's control, (b)
a taking by eminent domain, and (c) "business frustration."
The American cases reflect the early uncertainty of the English
courts1°' as to the effect of the destruction of the leased premises in the
absence of fault of either party and in the absence of anticipatory coven-
ants. The cases are in disagreement as to the effect of total destruction of
the demised res by casualty beyond the control of the lessor or lessee.1"'
104. PUFFENORF, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 505 (1931), held that the lessee
should be excused if the thing demised perished during the term without his fault, and
that he should be entitled to apportionment. He cited Herodatus Book II as to a ruling
by Pharoh Sesosties on land eroded by the Nile.
At common law, tenants were not liable for waste by accidental burning. Under
the Statute of Gloucester, tenants for life and years became absolutely liable. But by
6 Anne Ch. 31 (1706), tenants were excused from liability for waste by accidental fire.
LITTLETON § 71 distinguished between a tenant for years who was bound to sustain
or repair a house, and a tenant at will who was not.
105. Total destruction by fire releases obligations under lease: Heart of America
Lumber Co. v. Belove, 111 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1940); Wood v. Bactolina, 48 N.M.
175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
Statutes discharging liability in case of total destruction: Lebanon Production
Credit Ass'n v. Feldhaus, 34 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio App. 1938); Smith v. Gillen, 245 S.W.2d
596 (Ky. 1952) ; LA. CiV. CODE art. 2697 (Slovenko 1961), Thomas v. Snodhalter, 19 So.
2d 885 (La. App. 1944); Millen Hotel Co. v. Gray, 67 Ga. App. 38, 19 S.E.2d 428
(1942); Jacoby v. Peck, 23 Cal. App. 183, 137 P. 264 (1913); Colonial Land Co. v.
Asmus, 82 N.J.L. 521 (1911).
Cases holding that total destruction of the premises releases obligations under the
lease: Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135 P.2d 302 (1943) ; Joiner v. Bright-
well, 252 Ala. 112, 39 So. 2d 414 (1949) ; O'Bryne v. Henley, 161 Ala. 620, 50 So. 83
(1909).
Cases holding that total destruction by fire did not release: Iespersen v. Desert
News Pub. Co., 225 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1951) ; General Ins. Co. of America v. Christian-
sen Furniture Co., 229 P.2d 298 (Utah 1951).
Total destruction does not excuse lease obligations. Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. 44,
3 Am. Dec. 457 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1808).
Tenant held liable, even though premises destroyed. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63
(1809) ; Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477 (1932) ; Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89 (1869).
In the absence of a covenant to rebuild, total destruction by fire does not relieve
liability to pay rent. Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 92 Am. Dec. 306 (Dec. C.P. Ct.
1967). See Solomon v. Neisner Bros., 93 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Penn. 1950); Joiner v.
Brightwell, 252 Ala. 112, 39 So. 2d 414 (1949) ; Wilson v. Treadwell, 81 Cal. 58, 22
P. 304 (1889) (California exception is limited to dwelling habitations) ; Cowell v.
Lumley, 39 Cal. 151, 2 Am. Rep. 430 (1870) ; Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d
883 (1944); Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. 44, 3 Am. Dec. 457 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1808);
Ferrucci v. McDermott, 138 Misc. 438, 246 N.Y.S. 22 (Oneida County Ct. 1930)
[Interpreting N.Y. Real Prop. § 227 (1945)]; Gates v. Green, 4 Paige ch. 355, 27
Am. Dec. 68 (N.Y. Ct. of Ch. 1834); Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156
N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911); Linn v. Ross, 10 Ohio 412, 36 Am. Dec. 95 (1941);
Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Ore. 532, 144 P. 572 (1914) ; Japhet Polemanokos,
160 S.W. 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Jesperson v. Desert News Pub. Co., 119 Utah
234, 225 P.2d 1050 (1951). See also Note, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to
Extinguish Other Interest by Judicial Process, 42 Hav. L. Rv. 30 (1928) ; 3 Kent's
Comm. *373.
Liability released. Smith v. Gillen, 219 Ark. 853, 245 S.W.2d 396 (1952) (building
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Of course, the lessee is not excused if the fault is his,1"8 but he is
released if the fault is that of the lessor.1"' The courts seldom grant
proportionate relief where the use has only been diminished, or inter-
rupted by such casualty."0
There is likewise sharp disagreement as to the effect of a taking by
eminent domain. If only a part of the term is taken, under the principal
rule the lessee remains liable on the lease and must look to the con-
demnor for damages.' ° Some authorities follow a similar rule where
there has been a total taking, while others exonerate the lessee and permit
a rental apportionment."
Where premises have been leased for a stated commercial purpose
need not be wholly destroyed, but rather merely unusable) ; Schwecke v. Leone, Inc.,
21 N.J. Misc. 6, 29 A.2d 624 (Hudson County Ct. 1942); Mellis v. Berman, 9 N.Y.S.2d
553 (App. Term. 1938) (eminent domain taking) ; Bornard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155
App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913) (in an action for breach of covenant, defendant
was held justified in abandoning premises when landlord failed to exterminate rats and
vermin-odors).
For an attempt to distinguish between total destruction during the interesse termini
and the actual taking of possession, see Willard v. Tillman, 19 Wend. 360 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1838) (dissenting opinion) ; Wood v. Hubbell, 10 N.Y. 479 (Ct. of App. 1853).
Under the common law rule not even total destruction terminated the lease, except
when only part of the building was leased. Davis v. Shepperd, 196 Ark. 302, 117 S.W.
2d 337 (1938) ; Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 158 A. 891 (1932) ; White v. Steele, 33
S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 260, 135
P.2d 302 (1943) ; Finnegan v. McGavock, 320 Wis. 112, 283 N.W. 321 (1939) (partial
destruction did not release).
106. Gunther v. Oliver, 97 N.J.L. 376, 117 A. 402 (1922) ; Wainwright v. Helmer,
193 N.Y.S. 653 (1922).
107. Acts of the lessor depriving the lessee of beneficial use or enjoyment of the
whole or a part of the premises constitutes constructive eviction. Telegraph Ave.
Corp. v. Raentsch, 205 Cal. 93, 269 P. 1109 (1928) ; Annot., 61 A.L.R. 366 (1929)
Hopkins v. Murphy, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N.E. 252 (1919) ; Annot., 13 A.L.R. 816 (1921)
Blomberg v. Evans, 194 N. C. 113, 138 S.E. 593 (1927) ; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 686 (1928).
108. Only total destruction relieves. Eggen v. Wetterborg, 193 Ore. 145, 237 P.2d
970 (1951).
Common law rule abated only in case of total destruction. Wood v. Bartolino, 48
N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944) (refusing to apply "commercial frustration" rule to
illegality of use by legal prohibition) ; Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135
P.2d 302 (1943).
109. Clark v. Erich, 31 Cal. Rep. 628 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (partial condemnation
does not avoid, but lessee entitled to part of proceeds) ; Leonard v. Autocar Sales &
Service Co., 325 Ill. App. 375, 60 N.E.2d 457 (1945), aff'd., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N.W.2d 497(1945), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 804 (1963) (condemnation for part of term does not
absolve). Contra McCardell v. Miller, 22 R.I. 96, 46 A. 184 (1900) (permitting pro
tanto release).
110. Total taking by eminent domain held a good defense. Corrigan v. Chicago,
144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893); Annot., 21 A.L.R. 212 (1922); Levine v. Horwitz,
373 Pa. 77, 95 A.2d 540 (1953). Contra, Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408, 38 Am. Dec.
737 (1842); P.J.W. Moodie Lumber Corp. v. A.W. Banister Co., 286 Mass. 424, 190
N.E. 727 (1934).
Lessee released (leading rule). Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526 (1927)
Annot., 53 A.L.R. 679 (1928) ; Lowell Housing Authority v. Save-Mor Furniture
Stores, Inc., 346 Mass. 426, 193 N.E.2d 585 (1963) (condemnation terminated lessee's
rent). Contra, Foote v. Cincinnatti, 11 Ohio 408, 38 Am. Dec. 737 (1842).
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and the accomplishment of this purpose is prevented by act of the soverign,
without fault of the lessee, some authorities terminate the lease at the
lessee's request on the "businss frustration" theory.111 However, the
attempt to extend this theory to destruction of the leased res has been
rebuffed.
Tort Liability of the Lessor
The chief assaults on the common law caveat lessee rule have been
achieved in tort actions against the lessor. While Pennsylvania in the
earliest tort cases found liability in the lessor,112 later American deci-
sions found a wall of immunity protecting the lessor from property
damage or personal injury claims arising our of dangerous conditions
on the leased premises. 1  The announced justification i the
exclusive possession of the lessee. 1 4 Today, Louisiana alone imposes a
liability on the lessor to keep the leased premises safe for the use for
which they are rented.1 5
One of the joys of the "Common Law" is that, under our federal
system, any departure under moral or economic pressure leads to a
variety of results. In the case of torts on leased premises, this reaction is
stimulated by the presence of the interests of others than the contracting
parties.
While the caveat emptor tort rule has been criticized,' no court
has yet dared to openly repudiate it. But the rule has survived in a harsh
111. Business frustration denied even where the lessor induced the authorities to
take away the lessee's liquor license. Baughman v. Portman, 12 Ky. L. 342, 14 S.W. 342
(Ct. App. 1890); International Trust Co. v. Schumann, 158 Mass. 287, 33 N.E. 509
(1893).
Interruption by war used as a defense to rent liability. Bayly v. Lawrence, 1 Bay
499 (S.C. 1795).
112. Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111 (1856) ; Godley v. Hagerty, 8 Hanis 387 (Pa.
1853).
113. Lessor not liable for tort in the absence of fraud, concealment, or a covenant
in lease. Hogan v. Miller, 153 Cal. App. 2d 5, 314 P.2d 230 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Taylor v. Stimson, 52 Wash. 2d 278, 324 P.2d 1070 (1958).
No tort liability in the absence of actual knowledge. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 70, 183 P.2d 325 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947). But see Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn.
502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960) (mere reason to suspect existence of dangerous condition
creates liabiltiy) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 577 (1963) ; accord, Rick v. Baslerfield, [1847]
4 C.B. 783, 16 L.J. Cp. 273; Nelson v. Liverpool Brewing Co., [1877] 2 C.P.D. 311,
462 J.C.P. 675.
No tort liability unless latent defects were known to the landlord. Galbreath v. N.Y.
State Realty Liquidating Corp., 170 N.Y.S.2d 950 (App. Div. 1958).
114. Ellis v. McNeese, 109 Cal. App. 667, 293 P. 854 (Dist. Ct. 1930); Bouy v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 338 Pa. 5, 12 A.2d 7 (1940) ; Miller v. Vance Lumber
Co., 167 Wash. 348, 9 P.2d 531 (1932).
115. Bost v. Provenza, 47 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 1950) ; LA. CML CODE art. 2695
(Slovenko 1961).
116. See generally Waite, Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process, 25 COLUM.
L. REv. 129 (1925).
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climate. This distaste for the rule is consonant with the modern lego-
religious desertion of the Baal of real property in favor of the Yhvh of
Man. Perish the thought that anything but the purest concepts of juris-
prudence would ever creep into the judicial mind-but courts may be
aware of the modern device of liability insurance. At all events, there are
abundant exceptions to this tort rule.
The possession justification of the tort rule would be capable of
rationalization if confined to conditions created by the lessee alone. But
the justification is difficult to equate to the accepted theories findings
liability in the context of chattels.117
It is possible to rationalize that, in the case of injuries to third
persons, the lessee as the possessor in control should alone be liable for
defects. But except for the historical philosophy of the leasehold as the
sale of a real interest, there is no explanation of the lack of liability of the
lessor to the lessee for the lease of real property carrying an inherently
dangerous latent defect. One who releases possession of a chattel to
another remains liable in a measure for injuries resulting from defects in
the chattel. A sells or leases to B a mobile home which contains a defect.
B is injured thereby. A is liable though he did not know of the defect. A
leases to B a fixed home containing a defect. B is injured thereby. A
is not liable to B even, under the older rule at least, if A knew of the de-
fet.
Tradition has limited this chattel liability to the buyer-seller relation-
ship. The common law of chattels has long maintained a barrier of
immunity between the maker and the first buyer of a defective chattel,
barring claims of subsequent vendees against the maker on lack of
privity." But in recent years this defense is breaking down, and the
injured party is frequently able to penetrate through to the maker." 9
The duty of the lessor under the common law is no higher in
the case of such third parties than in the case of the tenant. 2 Since he
has ,surrendered all right of possession to the tenant, the lessor cannot be
117. One English case, Mint v. Good [1951] 1 K.B. 517, has tried to liken the
lessor's liability in tort to that of the manufacturer of a defective chattel. This claim has
not had much support. Devine v. London Housing Society [1950] 2 All E.R. 117; see
Note, 67 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 145, 148 (1951).
For a discussion of the theory that solidification of the property law was due to
lack of social pressures for reform and the consequent influence of the lawyers who
relied upon precedent, see Humphrey, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE
ENGLISH LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY WITH OUTLINE OF CODE (London, 1820) 3, 1179.
118. Winterbottom v. Wright [1842] 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402; Savings
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
119. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See
generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
120. Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen, 4 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 31
(1928) ; Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952). See generally
THOMPSON on REAL PROPERTY § 1241 (rev. ed. 1965).
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held accountable for injury or loss to persons who are on the leased
property at the instance of the tenant.
12 1
These principles follow the English precept. But even the gauge of
the common law has balked at carrying them to their ultimate conclusion.
When third parties are involved there is a strong thrust to require the
lessor to share the lessee's exposure for unsafe conditions arising from
negligence. But the approach again has involved making exceptions to the
rule rather than challenging the foundations.
The tort liability of the lessor is subject to classification according to
the relationship of the aggrieved party: (a) the tenant, (b) members of
nis family, (c) persons on the premises with the tenant's permission, and
(d) the general public. Attempts have been made to subdivide (c) into
guests, invitees and business invitees.
The tort exceptions embrace all those advanced against the basic
caveat lessee rule, along with a few new overtones. Both the furnished
house concept of Smith v. Marrable'22 and the seasonal renta' 28
exception to the rule are recognized.
I. Common Area
Perhaps the strongest thrust of the courts away from caveat lessee
is in the common area concept. Here the American law has not merely
followed but has gone much beyond the English doctrine.'24
If the basis for the tort rule is the fact that the lessor has surrendered
possession and control to the lessee, then it should not be applicable to
areas where the lessor has retained control. Virtually without exception,
the American courts recognize liability in the lessor for claims arising in
areas as to which exclusive possession has not been given to the lessee.
In the hotel situation the owner is clearly subject to tort exposure.
And in the case of areas in common use, the courts unanimously subject
the lessor to some degree of care.
The "common area" exception extends liability into other areas.
121. White v. Spreckels, 10 Cal. 287, 101 P. 920 (1909). But see Bostian v.
Jewell, 254 Ia. 1289, 121 N.W.2d 141 (1963) (lessor held to a higher degree of liability
to third parties than to tenants in the case of common passageways) ; Long v. Flanigan
Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963) (still insisting upon the priority rule).
122. Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942) (holding lessor
liable for damages due to sickness and injury arising out of breach of implied covenant
of fitness in a furnished apartment) ; Annot., 139 A.L.R. 257 (1942). Contra, Starve v.
Fitzie Hotels, 44 Cal. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955).
123. Primus v. Bellevue Apts., 241 Ia. 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950); Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 565 (1952); Bowser v. Artman, 363 Pa. 388, 69 A.2d 836 (1950); Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 213 (1950); Lennox v. White, 133 W.Va. 1, 54 S.E.2d 8 (1949).
124. Donnelly v. Larkin, 327 Mass. 287, 98 N.E.2d 280 (1950) ; Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d
487 (1952) ; Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956) ;
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1958); Pritchard v. Terrill, 189 Ore. 662, 222 P.2d 652
(1950) ; Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 358 (1952).
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Included within its scope are areas not necessary to the use of the
demised premises but to which access is offered by the lessor for the
convenience of the lessee, areas considerd as environs, and sections where
the lessor has retained exclusive possession. There is, likewise, potential
liability in the case of areas to which the lessee is invited. In other areas
where the lessor has retained possession the lessee is a trespasser.
a. Scope of the Lessor's Duty. The accord as to the liability of the
lessor for common areas dissolves when the theoretical rule is applied to
the facts. Certain courts merely require the lessor to maintain common
areas in the same condition as at the time of letting." 5 The most popular
test requires the lessor to repair only if the defect is known or should have
been known... in the exercise of due or reasonable care.'27 Other
rules vary from a duty to periodically inspect... to a final position of
making the lessor almost an insurer of safe conditions.'29
In the case of areas to which an invitation is extended to the
tenants, such as laundry rooms, play rooms and roofs, a degree of care of
varying intensity has been imposed upon the lessor.' In areas to which
125. In Massachusetts, the common areas tort duty is to keep the common areas in
as good condition as they were at the time of letting. Regan v. Nelson, 345 Mass. 678,
189 N.E.2d 516 (1963).
126. Marion v. Bryson, 326 Mass. 618, 96 N.E.2d 165 (1950). Accord, Yazzolino v.
Jones, 153 Cal. App. 2d 626, 312 P.2d 107 (Dist. Ct. 1957) (lessor liable for defect in
common area only if known or should have been known to him) ; Johnson v. O'Brien,
258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 577 (1963) (actual know-
ledge not necessary to make lessor liable for defects resulting in injury).
127. Skupienski v. Maly, 47 N.J. Super. 409, 136 A.2d 41 (1957) (landlord has
duty of reasonable care regarding maintenance of common area). Accord, Gill v.
Jakstas, 325 Mass. 309, 90 NE..2d 527 (1949) ; Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844
(Mo. 1963) ; Corroso v. West Jersey Corp., 13 N.J. Super. 342 (App. Ct. 1951).
A landlord's tort liability is based on negligence for defective premises rather than
on his being an insurer. Girardot v. Williams, 102 Colo. 456, 80 P.2d 433 (1938) ; Wade
v. Yale University, 129 Conn. 615, 30 A.2d 545 (1943) ; Gibson v. Littlejohn, 67 Ga. App.
597, 21 S.E.2d 248 (1942) ; Flynn v. Katz, 164 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 1964).
128. Duty to inspect after receiving notice of a defect. Gibson v. Littlejohn, 67
Ga. App. 597, 21 S.E.2d 248 (1942). See also Newman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 77
N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950) (no duty on lessor to inspect 'before leasing) ; Annot.,
17 A.L.R.2d 694 (1951).
Lessor has a duty of periodic inspection of common areas. Guslinger v. Village of
Wilkins, 269 Minn. 116, 130 N.W.2d 62 (1964). Accord, Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan.
406, 320 P.2d 1029 (1958) ; Robinson v. Alston, 413 Pa. 296, 197 A.2d 40 (1964) (safe
stairways).
129. Revell v. Dugan, 192 Va. 428, 65 S.E.2d 543 (1951); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d
462 (1952).
Ordinary care in common use areas. Pritchard v. Terrill, 189 Ore. 662, 222
P.2d 652 (1951) ; Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 358 (1952) ; Revel v. Dugan, 192 Va. 428, 65
S.E.2d 543 (1951) ; Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 462 (1952).
Reasonable care. Schedler v. Wagner, 37 Wash. 2d 612, 225 P.2d 213 (1950)
Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 604 (1952). But see Festa v. Piemonte, 349 Mass. 761, 207 N.E.2d
535 (1965) (refusing relief to a tenant injured on a stairway which was not available to
tenants under ordinary circumstances).
130. Primus v. Bellevue Apts., 241 Ia. 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950) (liability in
laundry room) ; Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 565 (1952). This is particularly true if the access
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the lessee is denied admittance the lessor's liability is only the same as to
trespassers. 1 '
b. Environs. The environs problem has been disturbing. Walls,
roofs, driveways and sidewalks create questions of liability to tenants and
to third persons. A variety of answers have been reached by the courts.
When the entire premises are leased, the caveat lessee rule is applicable to
the lessee personally."' But in the case of multiple lessees, there is a
tendency to apply the common area rule to environs."'
As respects third persons on the premises with the lessee's consent
the common area concept as it varies from state to state operates on
environs."'
In the case of the general public there is sharp disagreement as to
whether the lessor or lessee or both are responsible for injuries resulting
from the existence of dangerous conditions in the environs."' An
example of this is the contrasting Massachusetts and Connecticut rule as
to the duty to remove snow and ice." 6
Some cases draw a distinction between passageways, stairways,
and the like for the common use of all tenants, and the walls of the
building. The former are considered as appurtenances to the property
which the tenants are invited to use. The walls, however, are not
considered as appurtenances or utilities separate from the demised
can be considered a right. Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621,
232 P.2d 262 (Dist. Ct. 1951) ; Keane v. Mclndoe, 93 Cal. App. 2d 82, 207 P.2d
1059 (Dist. Ct. 1949).
131. Kossine v. Styliano, 40 Cal. App. 2d 721, 105 P.2d 952 (Dist. Ct. 1940);
Smelser v. Deutsche Evangelische Lutherische Germinde Der St. Markus Kirche, 88
Cal. App. 469, 263 P. 838 (Dist. Ct. 1928).
132. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 124 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Lucas v. Brown,
82 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Harris v. Joffee, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170 P.2d 454 (1946).
133. Liability as to environs. Rodenbur v. Kaufman, 320 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
See also Weingreen v. Gromeberg, 416 Pa. 567, 207 A.2d 781 (1965) (lessor liable only
if there are multiple tenants).
134. No duty to remove snow and ice on the sidewalks of multiple dwellings. Root
v. Henry, 395 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. 1965). Accord, Zak v. Craig, 5 N.J. Misc. 275, 136
A. 410 (1927). Contra, Mitchell v. Thomas, 91 Mont. 370, 8 P.2d 639 (1932).
135. Fisher v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super., 226, 170 A. 875 (1934) (lessor
held liable). Contra, Handlon v. Copestone Temple Ass'n 106 N.Y.L. 362, 150 A. 386
(Ct. App. 1930).
Multiple dwelling owner must remove ice and snow. Robinson v. Park Central
Apts., 248 F. Supp. 632 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1965) ; Archer v. Blalock, 97 Ga. 719, 25 S.E.
391 (1896) ; Guthman v. Castleberry, 48 Ga. 172 (1873) ; Kuperschmid v. Tauszig, 208
N.Y.S. 464 (App. Term 1925).
136. Under the Massachusetts rule, the landlord is under no duty to remove snow
and ice from common passageways. Root v. Henry, 395 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. App. 1965).
The Connecticut rule, however, imposes such a duty. Reardon v. Shemelman, 102
Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925). Acco-rd, Brunswick Groc. Co. v. Spencer, 97 Ga. 764, 25
S.E. 764 (1896) ; Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 I1. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954) ; Vaillan-
court v. Rex Realty Corp., 326 Mass. 534, 95 N.E.2d 650 (1950) ; Massor v. Yates, 137
Ore. 569, 3 P.2d 784 (1931). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 657 (2nd ed.
1955).
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premises.
When the lease covers only a portion of the premises, as a room or
floor of a building, the lessor must maintain the portion of which he
reserves possession so that no injury comes to the lessee's goods. Thus
the lessor is liable for damage resulting from a leaky roof.. 7 or for
personal injuries arising through his negligence." 8 However, this does
not put the lessor in the position of an insurer."3 9 The lessor must have
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the defect. 40
II. Knowledge of the Condition
The courts, in handling the tort problem, have recognized an
exception when the lessor has knowledge of the defect. Here the rights of
third parties play an important role. Hence, we have an intriguing variety
of results regarding the duty of the lessor to disclose or to take positive
steps to remedy a defect known to him. What is actual notice or what facts
should impute notice? How much disclosure should be made and to
whom? To what extent may the lessor seek refuge behind the shred of
the exclusive possession of the lessee and the somewhat shopworn defense
of contributory negligence?
The duty of the lessor to investigate the existence of dangerous
conditions existing at the time of the letting and to make such fact known
to the lessee is more profound in the case of tort liability. The "puffing"
concept as distinguished from fraudulent misrepresentation is not
recognized in these torts.
Furthermore, some of the courts have not permitted the lessor to
remain silent as to knowledge of improper conditions from which damage
or injury develops. To. avoid liability even to the tenant, these cases
require that the lessor reveal conditions known to him. Many courts have
137. White v. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1877).
138. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
139. Liability if negligent. Brain v. J. P. Logan Realty Co., 265 App. Div. 965, 39
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1942).
140. Shotwell v. Bloom, 60 Cal. App. 2d 303, 140 P.2d 728 (1943) ; Corrigan v.
Antupit, 131 Conn. 71, 37 A.2d 697 (1944) ; Burton v. Rothchild, 351 Mo. 562, 173
S.W.2d 681 (1943). See also Civale v. Meriden Housing Authority, 192 A.2d 548
(Conn. 1963) (lessor held liable in tort for injury resulting from faulty design or
repair which was known to lessor at beginning of tenancy but not discoverable by tenant
through reasonable inspection) ; Cole v. Lord, 160 Me. 223, 202 A.2d 560 (1964) (tort
liability for known latch defect) ; Flournoy v. Kuhn, 378 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. App. 1964)
(tort liability for latent defects known to lessor but not discoverable by lessee) ; Rode-
bearer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 34 F.R.D. 488 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1964) (in the absence
of contractual or statutory duty, the lessor held liable in tort for a condition he know-
ingly concealed at the time of the lease).
Extent of the lessor's liability: Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N.E. 117
(1887) (to lessee) ; Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959) (to lessee's
family); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1230 (1961) ; Ames v. Brandvold, 119 Minn. 521, 138
N.W. 786 (1912). See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 358 (1934).
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also adopted a constructive knowledge rule. This, in effect, imposes a duty
of inspection upon the lessor.'41
The imputed knowledge exception in the United States antedates
even the recognition of the rule itself. In 1809 Pennsylvania held a
lessor responsible both for property damage and personal injury resulting
to bailors and their servants where the lessor had leased a building to the
bailee for warehouse purposes. The courts felt that the lessor should have
known that the building was not of adequate construction for the intended
purpose. 42 The scope of this exception, however, runs from actual
knowledge of existing conditions that are not obvious defects, through
awareness of facts which should give warning or even mere suspicion of
dangerous or potentially dangerous conditions, to a duty to inspect
before turning over possession. 48 As might be expected, the reasonable
care doctrine is the most popular.
Some cases adhere to the contributory negligence defense regarding
the tenant, preventing him from recovering against the landlord if as an
occupant he could have discovered the defect on reasonable inspection."4
However, the degree of diligence imposed upon third parties is not so
extensive. 4 In this context, the lessee's approval of the conditions has
been held immaterial.146
The lessor may be liable if he has practiced fraud upon the lessee as
to the actual condition of the premises from which the injury arises, or if
he is guilty of deliberate or wanton misconduct. 14 7 Here also a mere
expression of opinion is to be distinguished from fraud. 4
141. The lessor has a duty of ordinary care to inspect the premises before deliver-
ing possession if he has reason to suspect a defect. Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20,
386 P.2d 27 (1963) ; Nelson v. D'Agastino, 135 Conn. 384, 64 A.2d 539 (1949). See
Charlton v. Brunelle, 82 N.H. 100, 130 A. 216 (1925).
142. Robertson v. Nat Kaiser Inv. Co., 82 Ga. App. 416, 61 S.E.2d 298 (1950);
Ross v. Heberling, 92 Ohio App. 148, 109 N.E.2d 586 (1952).
143. Lessor has the duty of a reasonable man to warn a tenant of defects at the
time of leasing, even though they are obvious. Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386
P.2d 27 (1963). See Mark v. Belrose Corp., 367 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(lessor liable for injury to tenant even where defect was obvious).
144. No liability where the tenant knows of the dangerous conditions. 670 New
St. Inc. v. Smith, 170 Ga. App. 539, 130 S.E.2d 773 (1963).
But a tenant's knowledge of a defect is not necessarily knowledge of the dangers
involved. Canfield v. Howard, 109 Ga. App. 566, 136 S.E.2d 431 (1964).
A landlord has been held not liable for latent defects if the tenant should have
discovered them. Brandt v. Yeager, 199 A.2d 768 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
145. Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960); Cohen Bros. v.
Krumbein, 28 Ga. App. 788, 113 S.E. 58 (1922).
146. Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888).
147. Cote v. Blodgett, 70 N.H. 316, 48 A. 281 (1900); Cole v. McKey, 66 Wis.
500, 29 N.W. 279 (1886).
148. Wilkenson v. Clauson, 29 Minn. 91, 12 N.W. 147 (1882).
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III. Duty to Repair
The prevailing viewpoint today is that the independent covenant
concept of agreements by the lessor carries over into the tort field.
Accordingly, a contractual obligation of the lessor as to fitness of use,
safety, or a continuing promise to repair, does not of itself expose the
lessor to a tort liability to the lessee or others for damage or injury
resulting from dangerous conditions caused by breach of the lessor's
duty.14
9
There are modern cases, however, which do impose upon the lessor
a contractual duty to repair. In such situations, the duty extends to the
tort concept and imposes a liability on the lessor in favor of the lessee or
his family. 50 This liability sometimes extends to persons on the premises
with the lessee's permission. 5 '
Where, however, the lessor, whether pursuant to the performance of
a contractual' 52 of a statutory duty 5 or as a purely voluntary act,
54
149. No tort liability arises from a covenant to repair in the absence of latent
defects. Goff v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 415 (D. Me. 1958).
Lacking consideration, there is no liability for injury due to a failure to make
repairs. Lee v. Giosso, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803 (Dist. Ct App. 1965).
Metcalf v. Chiprin, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ; Tarrant v. Hull,
259 N.C. 238, 130 S.E.2d 321 (1963) (same holding as to employee of the lessee).
150. See Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959), overruling
Clyne v. Holmes, 61 N.J.L. 358, 39, A. 767 (1898) ; Prapper v. Kisner, 104 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1958) ; Marialli v. Berns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 666, 251 P.2d 72 (1953); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS, § 357 (1934).
The old non-liability rules for tort under a covenant to repair were based on lack of
privity. This has now been changed in England by statute. J. SALMON, LAW OF
TORTS, § 528 (12th Ed. 1957).
In England, third parties cannot base a cause of action on a lessor's contract with
the lessee for the lessor to make repairs. Fairman v. Perpetual Investment Building
Society [1923] A.C. 74 (1922) ; Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935) ;
Fried v. Buhrmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935). Contra Sordillo v. Fradkin,
282 Mass. 255, 184 N.E. 666 (1933).
151. Lischner v. Hahn, 273 Mass. 259, 173 N.E. 424 (1930); Hodges v. Hilton,
173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935).
The lessor has been held liable to a third person for breach of a covenant to main-
tain the entrance. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1951);
Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959).
Today, the weight of authority does not make a landlord liable in tort for injury
arising out of a defective condition on the leased premises, even though he has covenanted
to repair. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 124 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Busick v.
Home Owners Loan Corp., 18 A.2d 190 (N.H. 1941); Cullings v. Goetz, 231 App.
Div. 266, 247 N.Y.S. 109 (1931) ; Dorswitt v. Wilson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 623, 125 P.2d
626 (1942). Contra, Maday v. New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 127 N.J.L.
426, 23 A.2d 178 (1941) ; Des Marchais v. Daly, 135 Conn. 623, 67 A.2d 549 (1949).
It has been held that no liability to the tenant's invitee arises from the lessor's pro-
mise to repair. Rodenheaver v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 220 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio
1962).
152. Liability has been imposed on a lessor for negligent breach of a covenant to
repair if this creates an unreasonable risk to those on the land. Lammori v. Milner
Hotels, Inc., 63 N.M. 342, 319 P.2d 949 (1958) (called the modern rule).
This is also true where the agreement amounts to a covenant to keep in safe
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negligently makes repairs creating a dangerous condition, there is much
authority imposing tort liability for injuries caused by the objectionable
condition.1 Again, there arises the question of the nature of such
liability. and to whom the liability extends.'5 7
Also to be considered is the extent to which a lessor incurs additional
personal liability if, to protect himself against such liability, he reserves
the right of entrance on the leased premises for the purpose of inspection
and repair in the event the lessee permits a nuisance15 to arise or
continue.
IV. Statutory Provisions
Judicial assaults on the landlord's pocketbook have been abetted by
statute in a number of states. Such legislation initially concerned multiple
dwellings, the so-called tenement acts. The statutes involve the mainten-
ance of structural conditions, habitability in general, or specifics such as
lighting of stairs and hallways. The existence of such statutes leads to
the inquiry as to the extent to which public policy in the form of criminal
penal provisions overflows into the realm of tort liability.'59 If they do
condition. Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Ill. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952); McCourtie v.
Bayton, 159 Wash. 418, 294 P. 238 (1930).
153. A statute requiring a landlord to keep his building in good repair or safe
condition creates no contract rights or duties between landlord and tenant. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 15035, 17800, 17821 (West 1955); Metcalf v. Chiprin, 31
Cal. Rptr. 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
154. Nelson v. Myers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 P. 719 (1928); Kimmons v. Crawford,
92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (1926).
155. Even where the lessor is not liable in tort for breach of a covenant to repair,
he is liable if a further covenant exists to maintain in a safe condition for occupancy.
Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957).
A landlord making repairs voluntarily is liable only for gross negligence. Carney v.
Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965).
A lessor has been held liable if he voluntarily undertakes to make repairs, and is
negligent. Freddi-Gad Inc. v. Royal Holding Co., 45 N.J.Super. 471, 133 A.2d362 (1957).
The landlord has been held liable if he merely agrees to make repairs. Coates v.
Dewaskin, 379 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
A lessor making voluntary repairs has been held not liable in negligence to the
tenant's business invitee, but only to the tenant. Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502,
204 N.E.2d 448 (1965).
A lessor has been held liable for the negligent making of repairs to all who in the
contemplation of the parties are on the premises. Continential Oil Co. v. Ryan, 392
P.2d 492 (Okla. 1964) ; Green v. Independent Oil Co. 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964).
156. A statutory duty of the lessor to keep the premises in repair imposes a tort
liability of reasonable care, but not that of an insurer. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4050
(1949) ; Zisken v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629, 79 A.2d 816 (1951).
157. The Restatement does not distinguish between liability to the lessee and to
third parties. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 355-363 (1934).
Tenants and guests have been held entitled to the protection of a public housing
Code. Gilpin v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Black v. Partridge,
115 Cal. App. 2d 639, 252 P.2d 760 (1953). -
158. Leonard v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 86 Ga. App. 635, 72 S.E.2d 93 (1952) (no
liability).
159. Creating tort liability: Collier v. Hyatt, 110 Ga. 317, 35 S.E. 271 (1900)
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invade the tort field, the question remains whether the liability of the
lessor is absolute or whether the statute merely allocates the burden of
proof. 6 ' Even a statutory duty upon the lessor to repair does not always,
of itself, create a tort liability on breach.
Under a statutory duty to repair, a landlord has been held responsi-
ble for damage caused to the tenant's goods by a leaky roof.'' The lessor
also could be held liable for personal injuries to the tenant caused by a
defect in the premises." 2 Certain statutes provided that if, within a
reasonable time after notice to the lessor, he neglects to make repairs,
the lessee may make the repairs and deduct the cost thereof from the rent,
or otherwise recover it from the lessor. Such statutory provision becomes
a part of a contract of lease as though incorporated therein. 6 ' Even
under these statutes a landlord is not liable for damages caused by a
defective condition of the premises where the injury is caused by con-
tributory negligence of the tenant. The issue of contributory negligence
must be determined by the jury.' Such statutes do not make the lessor
an insurer of safety of the premises but merely hold him to reasonable
care.
165
Sometimes the lease imposes a specific contractual duty to repair
upon the lessee. This does not affect the lessor's tort liability as to persons
not in privity with the lessee. It does, however, pose the problem of the
extent to which waiver of a legal right by the lessee may be attributed
to those on the demised premises with the lessee's permission.
A few of the states are in accord with the English "small rent"
principle. This doctrine recognizes that mutiple housing dwellers are not
usually in a comparable bargaining position with the lessor. The states
adhering to this idea have adopted "tenement acts" which grant a measure
of protection to the tenant with respect to the tort liability of the land-
Hanlon v. St. Frances Seminary, 264 Wis. 603, 60 N.W.2d 381 (1953); Lasyone v.
Zenoria Lumber Co., 163 La. 185, 111 So. 670 (1927).
Cases imposing no additional liability are Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W.
864 (1934) ; Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242 P.2d 705 (1952) ; Cook v. Seidenverg,
36 Wash. 2d 526, 217 P.2d 779 (1950). Creating a reasonable care duty is Ziskin v.
Confietto, 137 Conn. 629, 79 A.2d 816 (1951).
160. Dein v. Holderfield, 275 Ala. 360, 155 So. 2d 314 (1963) (statute requiring
lessor to repair gas heater created liability) ; Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629, 79
A.2d 816 (1951) (statute as to common areas imposed duty on landlord) ; Gibson v.
Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 143 A. 635 (1928) (failure to perform statutory duty of
lighting gave rise to negligence) ; Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719
(1950) (tenement house statutes).
161. Florence v. Northoutt, 145 Ga. 265, 88 S.E. 933 (1916).
162. Archer v. Blalock, 97 Ga. 719, 25 S.E. 391 (1896).
163. Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934).
164. Johnson v. Collins, 98 Ga. 271, 26 S.E. 744 (1896).
165. Kitchen V. Landy, 215 App. Div. 586, 214 N.Y.S. 241 (1926).
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lord. 6'
The cases are not in accord when the public authority directs
repairs and the lessor's noncompliance results in injury.'67
Another possible exception has been noticed when the lessor has
constructed the house which is the subject of the letting. Here he may
have an implied covenant of safety and habitability similar to the manu-
facturer of a chattel. 68
V. Public Use
There is a line of authority extending the lessor's tort liability when
the demised premises were intended to be open to the public generally. 6 '
If the demised premises are of a public character, the lessor cannot avoid
tort liability to invitees of the lessee if the property was in a dangerous
condition when leased.17 But the role of the lessor is not that of an
insurer of the public safety. He is responsible only for the existence of
dangers of which he was aware... or should have noticed. 72
The rationale of the public use exception is unclear. Of the various
explanations given, a general public policy is probably the most
reasonable. 7 '
The courts have here drawn a line beyond which the historical
"common law" may not further transgress modern concepts of justice.
The exception itself has two exceptions. One limits the exception to
places of amusement. 7 ' Another applies the rule only to leases intended
for extensive public use, as opposed to occasional public admission."'
Both of these exceptions to the exception have only limited following.
166. Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934); Wechsler v. United
Produce Dealer's Ass'n, Inc., 126 Misc. Rep. 563, 214 N.Y.S. 136 (1926); Hanlon v. St.
Francis Seminary, 264 Wis. 603, 60 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
167. Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal. 2d 254, 253 P.2d 447 (1953); Lachowicz v.
Beaver Realty, Inc., 1 A.D.2d 738, 146 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1955).
168. Robertson v. Nat Kaiser Inv. Co., 82 Ga. App. 416, 61 S.E.2d 298 (1951).
169. E.g., Gentry v. Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
170. Zinn v. A.H. Hill Lumber & Investment Co., 176 Kan. 669, 272 P.2d 1106
(1954); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 359; Schlender v. Andy Johnson Co., 380 P.2d 523
(Okla. 1962) (public or semi-public exception) ; Atlantic Rural Exposition, Inc. v. Faga,
195 Va. 13, 77 S.E.2d 368 (1953) (where there is public use, a third party becomes a
licensee of both the lessor and lessee, when such parties share the profits).
171. Torwick v. Lisle, 286 Minn. 176, 128 N.W.2d 330 (1964) (public purpose
exception: lessor liable for known defect).
172. Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952) ("reason-
able care").
173. Row v. Redwood Men's Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d 12 (1952).
174. Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 51, 157 S.W. 570 (1913); Gentry v. Taylor, 182
Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
175. City of Daytona Beach v. Baker, 98 So. 2d 804 (1957) (no liability for
subsequent defects) ; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 359 (limitation to large numbers);
Hayden v. Second Nat. Bank of Allentown, 331 Pa. 29, 199 A. 218 (1938).
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VI. Third Parties
Where third parties were involved, the common law did not merely
require the lessor to share the lessee's burden of liability, but wholly
insulated the lessor."' This position prevailed even when the lessee
could not have known of the defect, but the lessor could and even did.'
This is logical-as the law understands logic-since "possession" was
and is a mystical concept under the common law.
At common law, members of the tenant's family, his employees,
guests, and invitees stand in the shoes of the tenant. Their right to
recover from the lessor for injuries arising from his failure to keep the
premises in repair is the same as that of the tenant if he suffers injury.7 8
This same restriction upon the liability of the landlord applies to sub-
tenants, their servants, employees, and to members of the subtenant's
family. The reason given is that by entering under the tenant's title,
without invitation from the owner, they assume the risk as the tenant
does. 9
Some cases have departed from this tradition. When a tenant has an
action against the lessor for breach of covenant, the injured third party
can bring a tort action against the lessor to avoid circuity of action. 8
A lessor cannot avoid liability to a stranger by covenanting in the lease
that he shall not be liable for repairs.' When the lessor has a duty to
third parties as a result of a nuisance, he cannot avoid this by contract
with the lessee. 2
Statutes8  and, in some cases, ' the courts, have shown a modern
tendency to abandon the old rule with respect to areas in multiple
dwellings when the lessor retains possession and control.'85 The lessor
may thus be liable to guests and invitees of the lessee who suffer injury
176. Velthuzen v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 17 N.J. Misc. 376, 9 A.2d
634 (1939) (no privity) ; Schlender v. Andy Johnson Co., 380 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1962)
(liable for unsafe public or semi-public premises if the owner by reasonable diligence
should have discovered).
177. Under Louisiana civil law, the landlord is held to strict liability for injuries of
third parties and for defects in the leased premises. LA. Civ. CODE ANN., art. 2322;
Green v. Southern Furniture Co., 94 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
178. Corcione v. Ruggieri, 87 R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958) (guests or family of
lessee have no greater right than lessee).
179. Leslie v. Glazer, 273 Mass. 221, 173 N.E. 413 (1930) ; Schley v. Steele, 59
Cal. App. 2d 402, 138 P.2d 733 (1943) (imposing a higher liability to third parties).
180. Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
181. Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N.E. 953 (1901) ; Cussen v. Weeks, 232
Mass. 563, 122 N.E. 757 (1919).
182. Dickey v. Suggs, 90 Ga. App. 124, 82 S.E.2d 24 (1954).
183. Morningstar v. Strich, 236 Mich. 541, 50 N.W.2d 719 (1950).
184. Powell v. Jaffee, 39 Ohio App. 236, 177 N.E. 523 (1929). Contra, Helwig v.
Jordan, 53 Ind. 21, (21 Am. R. 1876) ; Cadwell v. Slade, 156 Mass. 84, 30 N.E. 87
(1892).
185. Hull v. Bishop-Stoddard Cafeteria, 238 Iowa 650, 26 N.W.2d 429 (1946).
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as the result of defective conditions86 in the areas in which the lessor
retains control.
The increasing authorities.. favoring the Connecticut... viewpoint
of the landlord's duty to remove ice and snow on common approaches as
distinguished from the non-liability of the Massachusetts8 9 rule are
evidence of this tendency away from the old caveat lessee doctrine.
Most courts hold that the landlord owes the same duty to business
visitors of the tenant as he owes to the guests of the tenant.90 Some
courts, however, have attempted the fine distinction between invitees and
licensees of the lessee.' Distinction has also been made between lessees
and tenants at sufferance.'
In some jurisdictions somewhat more attention has been given to
injuries suffered by third parties than to those of the lessee.9 3
VII. Nuisance
Under one rule, where the tenancy is periodic and not for a term, the
landlord has not made a sufficient release of control to absolve him from
liability to third persons resulting from a nuisance maintained by the
186. Moore v. Bryant, 27 Misc. 2d 22, 83 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1928).
187. Langhorne Road Apts., Inc. v. Bisson, 207 Va. 474, 150 S.E.2d 540 (1966)
(landlord liable for accumulations of ice and snow on common walkways).
188. Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925) ; Annot., 39 A.L.R.
287 (1925).
189. Woods v. Naumkiag Storm Cotton Co., 34 Mass. 357, 45 Am. R. 344 (1882).
190. Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (lessor has no tort liability
to third persons) ; Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957) (lessor
liable to business invitee) ; Goodman v. Provincetown, 283 Mass. 457, 186 N.E. 625
(1933) (invitees have no greater rights than tenant) ; Peirce v. Hunnewell, 285 Mass.
287, 189 N.E. 77 (1934) (exoneration provisions).
191. An attempt has been made in some cases to distinguish between persons who
are on the premises by express or implied invitation of the tenant and mere trespassers
or licensees who are there for their own convenience or profit. 32 AM. JuR. Landlord
and Tenant § 811 (1941).
The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 360 (1934), however, makes the lessor liable to
licensees as well as invitees. Swanson v. Godwin, 327 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1959); Hume
v. Ten Eycks, 245 App. Div. 794, 280 N.Y.S. 808 (1935).
Duty to an invitee of the tenant. Gulley v. Trader's Oil Corp., 102 Cal. App. 557,
283 P. 97 (1929) ; Chalmers v. Kolb, 9 F.2d 924 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
Less duty to mere licensees. Lally v. A.W. Perry Inc., 277 Mass. 463, 179 N.E. 155
(1931) ; Wierzbicki v. Thacker, 273 Mass. 346, 173 N.E. 512 (1930).
192. Ferno v. Roberts, 327 Mass. 305, 98 N.E.2d 611 (1951) (no duty to tenant at
sufferance).
Lessor's liability toward an employee or an invitee of the lessee is the same as his
liability to the lessee. Fraser v. Kruger, 298 F. 693 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Glidden v. Good-
fellow, 124 Minn. 101, 144 N.W. 428 (1913).
193. Lessor liable for a dangerous condition existing at the time of leasing and
known to the lessor and the lessee but not to a third party. Senner v. Dartwolf, 139 Ore.
93, 6 P.2d 240 (1932).
A covenant of non-liability is not binding on an employee of the tenant. Springer v.
Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N.E. 953 (1901).
Ordinance permitting tenant's employees to recover against the lessor. Patterson v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 16 S.D. 33, 91 N.W. 336 (1902).
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tenant. 4 This result is based upon the theory that each period is a
renewal of the lease, the lessor being therefore as liable as though the
nuisance existed at the beginning of the lease." 5 There is substantial
authority to the contrary, however.1"'
When the facts disclose that the injury resulted from a nuisance, the
courts rely upon varying factors in imposing liability on the lessor. A
distinction has been made between a public and a private nuisance.'97
If the nuisance existed on the premises at the time of leasing, there is a
tendency to hold the lessor liable along with the lessee for an injury
caused by the nuisance.' Likewise, the lessor may be liable where he
has retained a measure of control over the demised premises. 9
Dangers affecting public health may also fall into the nuisance
class.2"' But even here the old rule dies hard' and virtually all of the
194. Lucas v. Brown, 82 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1936) (liability as of the time of
renewal).
195. Perkins v. Weibel, 132 Conn. 50, 42 A.2d 360 (1945).
196. Perkins v. Weibel, 132 Conn. 50, 42 A.2d 360 (1945) ; Britton v. Donwin
Realty Corp., 23 N.J.L. 540, 10 A.2d 360 (1940).
197. Berl v. Rochester State Corp., 14 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Rochester City Ct. 1939).
A licensee of one of several tenants to a building bears the relationship of licensee
also to the lessor as to common areas if the licensee's presence could be reasonably
anticipated by the lessor, and there was a dangerous condition caused by landlord's
negligence. Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959) ; Annot., 78
A.L.R.2d 95 (1961).
198. Whalen v. Shwick, 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950) ; Annot., 33 A.L.R.
2d 74 (1954) (liable for nuisance existing at time of letting) ; Baldassare v. Crown
Furniture Co., 349 Mass. 183, 207 N.E.2d 268 (1965) (lessor's liability for nuisance).
A lessor was held liable to a neighboring landowner for a nuisance resulting from
defective premises when the defect existed at the time of letting. Woffard v. Rudick, 63
N.M. 307, 318 P.2d 605 (1957).
A lessor has been held liable for damages if the nuisance existed at time of leasing
or if the particular use was contemplated or if the property was adapted to causing the
nuisance. Hindman v. Texas Lime Co., 157 Tex. 592, 305 S.W.2d 947 (1957).
A lessor is liable for his tenant's nuisance if authorized or if there is an unreason-
ably great likelihood that the tenant will create the nuisance. Green v. Asher Coal Min-
ing Co., 377 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
The English law makes the lessor liable if he has leased the property with a
nuisance on it. Todd v. Flight, 142 Eng. Rep. 148 (1860).
This rule applies only if continuance of the nuisance was due to the failure of the
lessor to make the repairs required by the rental contract. G. Winnel v. Eamer, L.R. 10
C.P. 658 (1875); Pretty v. Bickmore, L.R. 8 C.P. 401 (1873),
199. A lessor has been relieved from liability for a nuisance if the lessee con-
tinues the nuisance after the letting. Howell Gas of Athens v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732,
146 S.E.2d 145 (1965).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (3rd. ed. 1964) disagrees with the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 366 (1934) position that the lessee as well as the vendee
assumes liability for a nuisance existing on the premises at the time of taking possession,
even if the occupier has had no opportunity to discover the existence of the nuisance.
He has substantial support for the liability of the lessor in McDonough v. Gilman,
85 Mass. 264 (1861).
200. Hamilton v. Feary, 8 Ind. App. 615, 35 N.E. 48 (1893) ; Long v. Chicago, K. &
W. R.R., 48 Kan. 28, 28 P. 977 (1892) ; Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397
(1888). See Smith v. Wolsiefer, 119 Va. 247, 89 S.E. 115 (1916).
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cases involve the lessor's knowledge, so as to raise the implication of
fraud.
20 2
Regarding third parties, the American doctrine has extended the
nuisance rule beyond conditions which are actually dangerous at the time
of transfer, to situations of potential peril 22 and even to intended uses
which may bring about a nuisance. 20" Therefore, the lessor is also liable
if he lets the land for purposes from which a nuisance will naturally
arise.202 And if the nuisance arose out of non-repair, and the factors
producing the defect were of such extensive and material character that
the lessee could not have been required to repair, the lessor is liable for
the nuisance.208
Attempts by lessors to restore their common law tort immunity by
exculpatory clauses in leases have met with varying results.0 Such
clauses have been held generally not to transgress any basic public policy
as far as they purport to be a waiver of the lessee's personal rights.20 1
201. Finney v. Steele, 148 Ala. 197, 41 So. 976 (1906) ; Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass.
471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888).
202. Maryland for Use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d
414 (4th Cir. 1949) (dictum) ; Owens v. Ramsey, 213 Ky. 279, 280 S.W. 1112 (Ct. App.1926) ; Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381, 29 N.E. 591 (1892) ; Kern v. Myll, 80 Mich.
525, 45 N.W. 587 (1890) ; Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (App. Div.
1953) (a lessor knowing that the premises were infected with disease was liable to lessee
who contracted the disease) ; Ceaser v. Karutz, 60 N.Y. 229, 19 Am. Rep. 164 (1875).
203. Statute requiring a gas appliance to be maintained in good repair imposes a
duty on the lessor, but only after tenant gives notice of lack of repairs. Morris v. Oney,
217 Cal. App. 2d 623, 32 Cal. Rptr. 88 (Dist. Ct. 1963).
Lessor held liable for the death of a fireman when the lessor had violated a safety
ordinance. Dini v. Norditch, 20 Ill. App. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
204. Benton v. Kernan, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 13 A.2d 825 (1940), modified, 130 N.J.
Eq. 193, 21 A.2d 755 (1941) ; San Angelo v. Sitas, 143 Tex. 154, 183 S.W.2d 417 (1944).
205. Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen, 4 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1924); .Annot., 53 A.L.R.
311 (1928).
206. Moretti v. C. S. Realty Co., 78 R.I. 341, 82 A.2d 608 (1951); Annot., 39
A.L.R.2d 963 (1955).
207. Weirick v. Hamm Realty, 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175 (1929); Midland
Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Associated Properties, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 42, 216 A.2d 231(1966) (exculpatory clause valid as respects industrial property); Olson v. Hoffman,65 Ill. App. 2d 87, 213 N.E.2d 68 (1965) (exculpatory clause in private real estate
leases); Thomas-Mack v. Ursula Holding Corp., 5 A.D.2d 837, 170 N.Y.S.2d 926(1958) (exculpatory clause void) ; Dien v. Holderfield, 155 So. 2d 314 (Ala. 1963)(exculpatory clause protected against injury to tenant's wife).
208. Exculpatory clause of lessor was not valid on grounds of public policy as
against the tenant or occupant, there being no distinction between business and
residential property. O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d
349, 146 N.E. 2d 198 (1957).
Clause in lease purporting to bar tort claims for injury to persons or property
arising out of the use of lake and recreational facilities leased, and providing for both
parties to carry liability insurance, did not protect the lessor against liability to third
parties caused by defective conditions arising from lessor's negligence. Larson v.
Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist., 32 Cal. Rptr. 875, (Dist. Ct. App. 1963)(liable as to retained possession where persons on land were there with the lessor's
consent and the lessor's approval, if the lessor could by reasonable diligence have
discovered the defect).
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But the courts' distaste is shown in that the clauses are most strongly
construed against the lessor.2"9
CONCLUSION
One must adopt the pessimism of Schopenhauer in attempting to
reach conclusions as to the future of caveat lessee in American law.
Most of the courts today view with revulsion a landlord playing the
role of Pontius Pilate. 1 ' But almost without exception the judges
decline to advance beyond the judicial barrier, requiring that changes in
the common law come from the legislature. This doctrine itself defies
common sense. If the judiciary, supposedly comprising the most learned
of the legal profession, cannot determine the origin of existing legal
concepts and the extent to which the atrophy of their roots has destroyed
their meaning, how can a legislature, made up largely of laymen, be
expected to be endowed with such wisdom?
Most interesting in this situation is the varying ideas of the states
as to what the "common law" is or was. English iconoclasts have
remarked that the common law was what the seventeenth century lawyers
did not know about the thirteenth century. Today a cynic may similarly
perceive that the "common law" is what the court of each state uses to
justify its position with relation to a particular state of facts.
This is an age in which medicine, science, philosophy and related
schools of thought no longer accept as correct those propositions which
have no apparent merit other than antiquity. Not so the law. That which
was accepted as truth in the time of the Plantagenets remains immutable.
Legal egotism spurs the belief that laws may influence economic
development as well as the converse. If this be true, we may hypothesize
that the spreading of slum conditions in the course of increasing urbaniza-
tion was materially promoted by the non-existence of legal liability of the
landlord for the conditions of his rental properties. It may be asserted
with some force that the ghetto development in the United States is a
209. Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Associated Properties, Inc., 90 N.J. Super.
42, 216 A.2d 231 (1966) (exculpatory clause strictly construed against lessor);
Larson v. Dauphin Realty Co., 224 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (exculpatory clause
construed against lessor).
An exculpatory clause was not effective where the proximate cause of the damage
was the lessor's violation of a city ordinance. Hanna v. Lederman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Nor does an exculpatory clause cover the lessor's active
negligence. Plastone Plastic Co. v. Whitman-Webb Realty Co., 278 Ala. 95, 176 So. 2d
27 (1965).
The courts have shown a similar reluctance to set aside the common law approval
of exculpatory clauses in leases. See Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldg., 20
Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958).
210. Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1952), contains a dissenting
opinion to the effect that courts should require the lessor to repair.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1968], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol2/iss2/1
CA VEA T LESSEE
direct consequence of adherence to Coke's maxim. Had the law in its
early stages in America been cloaked with the social enlightenment of
today, the consequent liability of the landlord would have mitigated
against the growth of city slums. It is questionable whether even today
social consciousness has progressed so far that instincts of self interest
have been wholly supplanted in this area.
The attention of those interested in a solution of tenement conditions
has been channeled into the broad river bed of governmental assistance.
But public housing and rental subsidies are insufficient. As long as the
fee is in private hands there is no impelling force to keep rental properties
in proper condition when the tenant lacks equality in bargaining power.
There is evidence that conditions in public housing projects tend to
deteriorate when the government has merely supplied the financing
rather than assumed the entire responsibility.
Laws are, too often, made by lawyers for the benefit of lawyers or
for the benefit of influential clients of lawyers. Only when the malfunction-
ing of existing legal roots becomes so intolerable as to create social unrest
is there hope of legal reform. When this occurs, the solution too often is
found in the interference of the sovereign in private affairs rather than
voluntary improvement of the basic causes.
The caveat emptor concept in landlord and tenant relationships is
only one of the numerous instances in which property law concepts
molded under medieval conditions do not fulfill the demands of an
expanding society.
It is regrettable that the organized legal profession, like the medical,
has not been sufficiently alert to recognize the need for remolding its
thinking to confront the challenge. The possibility exists that this pro-
crastination may have eventualities as unsatisfactory to the lawyers as
recent developments have been to the physicians.
It must be conceded that the state courts have not had the oppor-
tunify, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, to sail over the seas
of tradition on the cloak of the federal constitution. An airworthy if less
maneuverable vehicle is provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. But
the opportunity for legal rectification of the situation was missed when the
Uniform Commercial Code limited implied warranties in Section 2-314
and 2-315 to "Goods" as defined in Section 2-105.
The coin is not wholly one-sided. Scriveners' language in leases has
been molded to fit the deep groove worn by centuries of legal footsteps.
Court decisions have a retrosepetive aspect as contrasted with the pro-
spective view of a statute. Any frontal attack on the caveat lessee doctrine
would perhaps inequitably affect long term leaseholds.
But "the poor must live." Any change in the landlord's position
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must increase his cost, not merely as to maintenance, but also as to taxes
and liability insurance. This burden must be passed on to the tenant,
resulting either in an increased share of the family budget for rent or in a
decreased standard of housing. At a decreasing economic level this looks
toward governmental rent subsidies. Sir Thomas Moore's dream is not
yet a reality.
The forward thinking of some of the later cases give warning to
prospective lessors not to place their trust too strongly in the common
law rule of non-liability in the case of torts. The waiver of liability in
the case of the lessee can, at least in the absence of fraudulent conduct by
the lessor, be avoided. The expanding social conscience may enforce a
liability on the lessor in the case of members of the lessee's family and
third parties. This tort liability cannot be wholly avoided by contract
between the lessor and the lessee. The answer therefore lies either in the
retention of a right of maintenance by the lessor, which may in turn
result in an increased degree of legal liability, 11 or in protection through
liability insurance. A lessor's lot is not a happy one!
The courts have shown, to date, little inclination to set aside earlier
decisions which worshipped at the caveat emptor shrine. But as matters of
first impression arise involving any of the numerous exceptions, particul-
arly in the tort area, there is a decided inclination to find against the
lessor.
This trend places a red flag encouraging all leases, particularly those
involving terms of some length, to contemplate in the rental charge the
necessity of ever-increasing liability insurance coverage in areas not
heretofore contemplated.
So children may fall,
But not in the hall
And boards may rot,
but not
On the stairs,
And rats may play,
but must also stay
Out of common areas.
211. De Clara v. Barber Steamship Lines, 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956)
Bukowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934) (no liability to third
parties from lessor's promise to repair) ; Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785
(1933); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 477 (1934) (reservation of right to enter to make repairs
creates liability).
Courts may revise an outmoded common law. Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156
A.2d 252 (1959) ; Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1230 (1961) ; Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear
Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
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